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14 December 1982

USSR REPORT
USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No. 8, August 1982

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EDITORIAL SURVEYS SOVIET ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 15 Jul 82) pp 3-6

[Editorial: "In Defense of the Cause of Peace. The USSR's New Historic Initiatives"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The entire world followed the proceedings of the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament with great interest. The message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and other Soviet documents submitted for discussion at the session opened up new possibilities for the cessation of the arms race and the elimination of the danger of nuclear war. The world public, statesmen and politicians were particularly interested in the following statement in L. I. Brezhnev's message: "Guided by the desire to do everything within its power to deliver people from the threat of nuclear annihilation and to completely exclude the very possibility of this kind of war from the life of mankind, the Soviet State solemnly announces:

"THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS PLEDGES NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST."

The USSR's solemn pledge not to use nuclear weapons first is a truly historic move. This is the first time in history that one of the nuclear powers has unilaterally assumed this responsibility.

The Soviet documents submitted to the session express not only the unanimous opinion and coordinated policy of the socialist community but also the hopes and desires of all people. The specific and far-reaching measures proposed in these documents have won the support of the people of the socialist countries and of millions of Western Europeans and Americans; they have been supported by many public spokesmen, statesmen and politicians in the West, prominent American senators and the overwhelming majority of participants in the world forum on disarmament.

The USSR's decision not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons was described in the United Nations as an exceedingly important way of preventing a nuclear catastrophe and raising the level of trust in relations between states. Participants in the mass antiwar demonstrations that were held in Western Europe and then moved across the ocean to the United States have unequivocally declared their position on this cardinal issue of the present day.

Today it is no longer possible to ignore the irrefutable and definite fact that nuclear war would mean the destruction of human civilization and perhaps the end of life on earth.

This is why it is the primary duty of the leaders of states aware of their responsibility for the fate of the world to make every effort to keep nuclear weapons from ever being used.

People have every right to expect other nuclear states to respond to the Soviet decision in kind. If they take on the same kind of clear and precise commitment not to use nuclear weapons first, this would actually be tantamount to a general ban on the use of nuclear weapons. This would virtually cancel out the probability of a nuclear war.

The USSR is willing to conduct talks with any interested side on the entire spectrum of problems connected with the prevention of war and the preservation of peace on our planet. The peaceful coexistence of states with differing social structures and the resolution of all disputes between them by peaceful means have always constituted the basis of the USSR's foreign policy. This is precisely the purpose of the Program of Peace for the 1980's, adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress. This is eloquently attested to by all of the peaceful initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union. Clear and convincing proof of this can be found in the statements by L. I. Brezhnev, which are filled with deep concern for the fate of the world and the need to eliminate the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet Union is convinced that no conflicts between states or groups of states, no differences in social structure, way of life or ideology, and no immediate interests should obscure the fundamental need common to all people--the need to save the world and prevent nuclear war. Of course, the Soviet Union will continue making its policy with a view to the behavior of other nuclear powers: They might listen to the voice of reason and follow its good example or they might try to push the world over the precipice.

The memorandum submitted by the USSR to the world community forum, "Averting the Mounting Nuclear Threat and Curbing the Arms Race," which summarizes the principled positions and most important specific proposals of the USSR, has made an important contribution to the Leninist foreign policy line of peaceful coexistence by states with differing social structures and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means.

The Soviet country has proposed measures, explained in great detail, to eliminate the nuclear threat and curb the arms race. This will be the purpose of the Soviet program of nuclear disarmament, envisaging its gradual accomplishment--from the curtailment of the development of new nuclear weapons systems to their total destruction. An agreement ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION would be of great importance in the attainment of this goal. The possibility of this kind of agreement, however, will depend on talks that are conducted expressly for the purpose of limiting and reducing strategic weapons, and are not used as a cover-up for the continuation of the arms race and the disruption of the existing balance. This fully applies to the talks on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Regardless of the difficulties that might arise, the USSR proceeds from its realization of the need for progress in the talks and is doing everything within its power to achieve

this. The success of any talks, however, requires that they be conducted with a view to the legitimate security interests of all parties and in strict accordance with the principle of equality and equivalent security.

The Soviet Union believes that it is also exceptionally important to block all channels for the continuation of the arms race in any form. This will require a ban on the development of new types of strategic weapons or an agreement on the maximum limits of their parameters. This is the purpose of the Soviet proposal of a quantitative freeze and maximum limit on the modernization of strategic weapons by both sides as soon as the talks begin.

IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION IN EUROPE, the Soviet Union reaffirms its willingness to reach an agreement on the complete renunciation by both sides of all types of medium-range weapons capable of striking targets in Europe. The USSR, L. I. Brezhnev stressed, might consent to even further steps: an agreement on the removal of all medium-range nuclear weapons and tactical arms from Europe. If the United States and its allies are not prepared for an all-encompassing solution to this problem, the USSR might consent to a gradual but extremely significant mutual reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons.

In the hope of contributing to the success of the talks in Geneva, the Soviet Union adopted a decision, as a sign of its goodwill, to impose a moratorium on the further deployment of its medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR. Furthermore, the USSR announced its intention, also on a unilateral basis, to reduce some of these weapons, and this work is effectively already in progress.

In general, in the area of nuclear disarmament the USSR is prepared, but naturally on the condition that all nuclear powers do the same, to take the ultimate step: to agree on the total elimination of all nuclear weapons--strategic, medium-range and tactical. It should be stressed, however, that there can be no detached observers in the Soviet-U.S. talks.

The USSR is also appealing for A TOTAL AND UNIVERSAL BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTS, THE PREVENTION OF THE FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE CREATION OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES.

In addition to nuclear weapons, which have the greatest destructive potential, there are also other barbarous means of mass destruction, primarily chemical weapons. It is a horrifying fact, L. I. Brezhnev's message says, that just a few kilograms of the tens of thousands of tons of toxic substances with which some countries have armed themselves could kill several million people. And to make matters worse, new programs are being drawn up for the production of even more refined lethal types of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union believes that all necessary steps should be taken to remove these "silent death" weapons from the world. For this purpose, it submitted draft "Basic Provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction" to the special session.

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AREAS OF THE GENERAL STRUGGLE FOR A PEACEFUL FUTURE FOR OUR PLANET IS THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN SPACE. The USSR is in the vanguard of this struggle, vigorously fighting to keep outer space from becoming a new sphere of

military confrontation and to prohibit the emplacement of any type of weapon in outer space. The Soviet memorandum proposes that the UN Disarmament Commission immediately begin drafting the appropriate international agreement, and this proposal is particularly pertinent in light of the peace-endangering actions of the United States, which has resolved to militarize outer space.

As we know, the spaceship "Columbia" is making test flights with a military payload, although the Pentagon is carefully concealing the real purpose of these flights. According to American data, half of all the shuttle payloads up to 1994 will be of a military nature. Laser and antisatellite weapons are being developed in Pentagon laboratories and testing grounds. According to some estimates, the space laser program could put 50-60 billion dollars into the "feeding-trough" of the military-industrial complex. It is therefore not surprising that the previous administration cut off the talks on the limitation or prohibition of antisatellite systems, and the current one has expressed no desire to resume them. A special space command is being created in the U.S. Air Force, which will ultimately have complete jurisdiction over the space activity of all branches of the American Armed Forces. These disturbing facts testify that the United States is going against the wishes of all peoples by imposing a new and dangerous round of the arms race on the world.

The USSR also proposes the thorough discussion of such matters as THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITY AND THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND ARMED FORCES. The REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS is imperative, and a freeze on these budgets could be the first step in this direction. The USSR is appealing FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF THE LATEST SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DISCOVERIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS FOR MILITARY PURPOSES and has again proposed a WORLD TREATY ON THE AVOIDANCE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

The all-encompassing and specific Soviet proposals aimed at solving the burning problems of the present day provide eloquent proof of the USSR's firm adherence to its principled foreign policy, which was proclaimed in the Decree on Peace in the very first days after the October victory. Mankind has witnessed the titanic efforts of the USSR and the socialist countries to stop the unbridled stockpiling of increasingly destructive types of weapons, bring about the improvement of international relations and prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

L. I. Brezhnev's historic message to the session is an act of wise statesmanship, an act of Soviet goodwill and additional convincing proof of the Soviet country's profound love of peace.

The special session pointed up the watershed that exists between the peace-loving states and peoples and imperialist circles, which have a stake in arms race escalation. In his address at the session, President Reagan not only failed to respond in a like manner--that is, he did not take a pledge on no first use of nuclear weapons on behalf of the United States--but he did not even say a single word about how the United States intends to respond to the USSR's exceedingly important initiative. The refusal to follow the Soviet Union's example is tantamount to an admission that Washington is not concealing its aim of disrupting the existing military balance between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and achieving military superiority. It is openly relying on the use of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union is firmly convinced of the falsity of this logic of fear and force. It does not do anyone any good, including the people of the United States. The security of each side and of the world as a whole must not be built on fear or on attempts to achieve military superiority. The decisive motivating factor in relations between states must be the desire for accord, for dialogue and for mutual trust. From the standpoint of the interests of the people in both our countries and of mankind as a whole, the 26th CPSU Congress stressed, there is no other alternative.

The Soviet leaders have stressed numerous times from the rostrums of CPSU congresses, the Supreme Soviet and the appropriate international forums and in bilateral talks with many European, American, Asian and African officials that the USSR wants to live in peace with the United States and build its relations on a peaceful foundation. This is a long-range policy. It is not dependent on changes in mood and political conditions. This principled line is still fully in effect. The only requirement is mutual respect for legitimate interests and the construction of relations on the basis of the principle of equality and equivalent security in such a way that neither side can harm the other.

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U.S. OBSTRUCTS SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR DETENTE IN EUROPE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 15 Jul 82) pp 7-17

[Article by I. N. Shcherbakov: "The Conference on Military Detente and Disarmament in Europe and the U.S. Stance"]

[Text] The Madrid meeting of the states party to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was adjourned until 9 November 1982.¹ The February-March stage of the meeting was a "stage of lost opportunities"² due to the openly obstructionist stance of the United States and its chief NATO allies. As a result, participating states could not adopt a final document whose focal point was the decision to convene a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe.

In contrast to the constructive efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to reach mutually acceptable agreements on all sections of the final document, the United States tried to avoid the discussion of security and cooperation at the forum in Madrid, to turn it into an arena of ideological confrontation and to use it for interference in the internal affairs of the socialist states. With the aid of this tactic, Washington hoped to disrupt not only the discussion of the projected conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe but also the entire Madrid meeting and thereby inflict irreparable damage on the cause of detente in Europe. For this purpose, it made an unprecedented attempt to stage a NATO-composed series of unworthy anti-Polish and anti-Soviet performances in Madrid.

The fact that the script for the Madrid forum was prepared in advance in Washington was frankly admitted by the well-informed American weekly NEWSWEEK, which reported that even before the resumption of the Madrid meeting (in January 1982), the Reagan Administration "decided to disrupt normal proceedings by suspending the meeting until the end of the state of martial law in Poland." However, as a result of disagreements with the NATO allies, especially the FRG and France, which believe that the dialogue in Madrid should continue, Washington consented to a "working compromise": "Representatives of the NATO countries would go to Madrid but would refuse to discuss any issues other than the question of Poland."³

The destructive line of U.S. and NATO behavior in Madrid was in complete accordance with this NATO plan, which was approved on 11 January 1982 at a special conference

of the foreign ministers of the NATO countries in Brussels. At the same time, Washington made a special effort to cover up its obstructionist line at the Madrid meeting with propaganda to convince the Western European countries participating in the meeting that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were to blame for the situation in Madrid and to simultaneously portray the United States as an advocate of security and cooperation in Europe. In this context, a statement made by U.S. Under Secretary of State A. Holmes on 15 March at a press conference in the State Department was indicative. He tried to distort the actual state of affairs in Madrid by implying that the progress of the proceedings was being impeded by the Soviet Union's lopsided concern with disarmament and military detente in Europe, while the United States and NATO in general advocated a "balanced approach" to all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act, including questions of "human rights" and the projected conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe.

It must be said that this set of stereotyped propaganda theses, which are intended to misinform public opinion in the United States and in Western Europe, has been deliberately and purposefully used by Washington for many years, particularly since the time of the Belgrade meeting of the states party to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (from 4 October 1977 to 9 March 1978). It would probably be wise to analyze the U.S. stance on the military aspects of detente in Europe, particularly its attitude toward the projected conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe, the basic features of which were already apparent at the time of the all-Europe conference (from July 1973 to 1 August 1975).

As we know, part of the Final Act signed in Helsinki in 1975 by all of the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, including the United States and Canada, was the document on confidence-building measures and some aspects of security and disarmament. The signatories agreed to inform one another in advance of their large-scale military exercises and to invite observers from other states party to the conference to these exercises "in a voluntary manner and on a bilateral basis." The document says that advance information "will be provided for large-scale military exercises involving more than 25,000 ground troops, conducted independently or jointly with any other airborne or naval elements (in this context the word 'troops' includes amphibious and airborne troops)."⁴ In the event of independent exercises of amphibious or airborne troops or joint exercises in which they participate, these troops will also be included in this number. The zone of the confidence-building measures was also stipulated precisely: "Information will be provided about large-scale military exercises conducted in Europe within the territory of any signatory or, if applicable, in an adjacent maritime region or air space. If the territory of the signatory should extend beyond the boundaries of Europe (this applies to the USSR and Turkey--I. Shch.), advance information will only be provided for exercises conducted within 250 kilometers of its boundary facing or adjoining any other European signatory."⁵

The purpose of the original confidence-building measures was clearly stipulated in the document: to aid in the reinforcement of genuine trust between signatories, to lower the level of military confrontation and to strengthen stability and security in Europe.

The Helsinki act provisions on confidence-building measures laid an excellent foundation for a healthier atmosphere in Europe and also for the further development and improvement of the confidence-building measures,⁶ which was the result of the tremendous amount of painstaking work performed by all conference participants.

The reconciliation of the Final Act provisions on confidence-building measures was considerably complicated by the attempts of several NATO countries, especially the United States, to avoid the discussion of realistic measures that could actually strengthen trust and help to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe, for the purpose of replacing these measures with a system of effective control over the military activity of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states. The United States and its NATO allies worked closely together for the inclusion of a statement in the Final Act on the need for the "extensive and detailed" exchange of information about the military activity of participating states, the publication of detailed reports on military expenditures by states and so forth. When they took this approach, they were not hoping to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe, but to win control over the military activity of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Judging by a statement by U.S. Secretary of State W. Rogers on 5 July 1973, just before the second stage of the all-Europe conference (in Geneva), the United States believed that the main purpose of the confidence-building measures lay exclusively in an agreement on the exchange of "important military information" on the pretext of reducing the danger of a surprise attack.⁷

The U.S. approach to the confidence-building measures and their aims and its insistence that the military activity of states "be made public" and be monitored in isolation from measures to stop the arms race and effect real disarmament are nothing new in U.S. policy. Ample evidence of this can be found in the U.S. behavior in the UN Disarmament Commission at the beginning of the 1950's--for example, the U.S. proposal "regarding the gradual and constant disclosure and verification of armed forces and arms" (5 April 1952) and the so-called "Open Skies" plan, which was proposed by the U.S. President in 1955 and envisaged total and unlimited air surveillance of Soviet and U.S. territory, the exchange of military information and the placement of observers in key positions in both countries. Both of these proposals had nothing to do with actual steps to reduce troops and weapons. Furthermore, the "Open Skies" plan was obviously discriminatory and unfair.⁸

These tendencies in the U.S. approach to questions of military detente in Europe, including the confidence-building measures, were clearly reflected during subsequent stages of the all-Europe proceedings, particularly the Belgrade meeting of the states party to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was supposed to expand and intensify the confidence-building measures stipulated in the Final Act in addition to solving other problems.

In the belief that the most important and pressing issue for Europe is the need to consolidate the process of detente, to supplement political detente with military detente and to take practical steps toward disarmament, the Soviet Union proposed that a platform of action to strengthen military detente in Europe be discussed at the Belgrade meeting. The platform was put forward by L. I. Brezhnev in a speech in the Kremlin on 21 October 1977 and included the following elements: the conclusion of an agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons by the participants in the all-Europe conference; an agreement to prohibit at least the expansion of the membership of opposing military-political groups and alliances in Europe; the consistent implementation of such measures envisaged in the Final Act as the provision of information about large-scale military exercises, the invitation of observers to some exercises and the exchange of military delegations. With a view to the experience of the previous 2 years, the USSR expressed the opinion that it might be best

to limit exercises to 50,000-60,000 men. The Soviet Union also proposed that the military confidence-building measures stipulated in the Final Act be extended to countries located in the south Mediterranean if they should request this.⁹

The United States and its chief NATO allies rejected these proposals, however, and countered them with their joint proposal regarding the final document of the Belgrade meeting. In essence, the "confidence-building measures" proposed by the United States and NATO (the compulsory provision of, in addition to advance notification of large-scale troop movements, detailed information about the structure and location of troops, as well as additional information about troop movement routes and destinations, the endowment of military observers with virtually unlimited freedom to collect information, etc.) reaffirmed the NATO view of "confidence-building measures" as control over the military activity of signatories, unconnected with any steps to limit arms or effect disarmament, and its belief in the permissibility of simultaneously conducting these measures and escalating the arms race in order to achieve military superiority in Europe.

The U.S. stance was reflected in a letter sent by the U.S. Government to the UN secretary general on 10 July 1979. It stressed, in particular, that "the confidence-building measures included in the Final Act are intended mainly to make conventional military activity public by means of the provision of information about its various forms."¹⁰

It was precisely at this time (at the turn of the decade) that the United States and NATO decided to escalate the arms race in order to disrupt the existing balance and achieve military superiority to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This was clearly reflected in the military-strategic aims put forward in the NATO bloc's long-range (up to 1994) program of broad-scale military preparations, adopted at the May (1978) session of the NATO Council in Washington. NATO's intention to build up the nuclear strength of the bloc and increase its military expenditures was later reaffirmed in the decisions of the NATO Council sessions in Brussels (December 1979) and Rome (May 1981).

When the confidence-building measures were discussed at the Belgrade meeting, the United States and the NATO countries proceeded primarily from the need to reconcile their proposed measures with the NATO military-strategic line of arms race escalation. The further development and expansion of the confidence-building measures stipulated in the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki conference was impeded at the Belgrade meeting by the United States and its NATO allies with the aid of their campaign "in defense of human rights" (another of the imperialist countries' means of "psychological warfare" against socialism). An indicative comment was made by the head of the U.S. delegation at the meeting, A. Goldberg, when he frankly said on 8 March 1978: "We do not regard the all-Europe conference as a forum for disarmament talks."¹¹ By doing this, they also impeded the logical transition to the next stage--the discussion of the projected conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe.

The states of the socialist community brought up the idea of convening this kind of conference in May 1979 at a session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact States in Budapest.

The clearly obstructionist stance of the United States, which almost ended the meeting in Belgrade, evoked the dissatisfaction of some Western European allies. As A. Scharer, former head of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Geneva phase) and the preparatory meeting in Belgrade, remarked in a FOREIGN POLICY article, "NATO and the neutral countries regard the strategy of confrontation that was assumed by the United States in Belgrade on a unilateral basis as a threat to the all-Europe proceedings and the state of political detente in Europe."¹²

Under these conditions, the United States tried to rationalize its wholly negative attitude toward the projected conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe with references to the inexpediency of duplicate forums for the discussion of European disarmament. For example, State Department Counselor M. Nimetz, expressing the administration's point of view, said on 30 October 1979: "We are not in favor of the creation of new forums or procedures that might inhibit or threaten the goals we are pursuing through the current channels of arms control talks."¹³

At the NATO Council sessions in Brussels (December 1979) and Ankara (June 1980), the United States achieved a coordinated NATO concept of the projected conference on disarmament in Europe that was acceptable to itself. Under U.S. pressure, the final communique of the NATO Council session of 12 December 1979 limited the agenda of the projected conference to talks on confidence-building measures, which are "important in the military sense, can be easily monitored and are applicable to the entire European continent." The NATO document said nothing about the discussion of arms limitation or reduction measures at the conference.

In addition to this, the United States saw to it that the communique included the statement that the conference should not be a substitute "for the current talks on other aspects of arms control and disarmament on the European continent."¹⁴ According to American officials, this statement applies primarily to the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe. Besides this, at the NATO Council session in Brussels, the United States tried to win guarantees from its partners that all matters connected with confidence-building measures and military security would be discussed exclusively within the framework of the all-Europe proceedings because, in the opinion of the Americans, their discussion in any other forum "will undermine the discussion of the human rights issue in the context of the all-Europe proceedings."¹⁵

After securing an acceptable NATO approach to the conference, the United States continued its efforts to set firmer Western conditions for the projected conference. For example, the preliminary conditions for U.S. consent to the conference, set forth by the American secretary of state at the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly (fall 1980), include demands for "balanced progress" in all spheres at the conference in Madrid, including the sphere of "human rights" ("we will not allow questions of security to obscure or diminish the concern warranted by human rights in Madrid"¹⁶); and the extension of the zone of the application of the confidence-building measures to the entire European continent, "from the Atlantic to the Urals."¹⁷

It should be noted that the continuity and coincidence of the positions taken by the Carter and Reagan administrations were revealed during the Madrid follow-up

meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Statements by officials in both administrations indicate that questions of military detente and disarmament occupy a secondary position on the list of U.S. priorities with respect to the Madrid meeting.

Therefore, an analysis of the U.S. and general NATO approach to the idea of convening a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe on the eve of the Madrid meeting indicates that the United States and the NATO countries did not arrive at the Madrid meeting with any kind of positive program regarding this matter but, on the contrary, used the preparatory period to plan a line of ideological and political confrontation in Madrid in order to prevent the constructive discussion of this matter.

It is indicative that this opinion is shared even by several American experts. For example, A. Scharer took a discerning look at the preparations of the American delegation to the Madrid meeting and concluded that the United States was once again placing emphasis on so-called "human rights" and the "Afghan" issue and was thereby reaffirming its disregard for the "lessons of Belgrade" and its refusal to deviate from its planned script at the Madrid meeting, with the aim of confrontation. This is also the opinion of another American scholar, D. Andelman.¹⁸ In general, their remarks reflect the position of the members of some political groups in the United States who believe that a truly balanced approach to all issues on the Madrid agenda, including questions of military detente and the projected disarmament conference, and the abandonment of the "confrontation scenario" in Madrid would be more in line with long-range American interests. In particular, then Secretary of State C. Vance wanted the head of the American delegation to be a "moderate politician" rather than an advocate of confrontation. Supporters of the tough line in the U.S. administration prevailed, however, and this was attested to by the appointment of M. Kampelman as the head of the delegation. He is the former chairman of the International Research Center of the Woodrow Wilson Institute of Social and International Affairs and is known in the United States as an advocate of the American method of "defending human rights." This also affected the composition of the American delegation, which, in addition to diplomats, includes several U.S. congressmen from the notorious "Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe" (which is known to have been created by the U.S. Congress to "verify the observance" of the Helsinki agreements, especially in the "humanitarian sphere") and around 30 "public" spokesmen, who actually make up a veritable lobby within the delegation for the discussion of only "human rights" on American terms.

In spite of the inauspicious start of the Madrid meeting (through the fault of the Western powers, organizational matters were not settled by the deadline of 11 November 1980 during the preparatory stage), the Soviet Union and other socialist countries made consistent efforts to focus the work of the Madrid forum on the vitally important problems facing the people of Europe--the elaboration of practical measures to strengthen security and cooperation in Europe and the accomplishment of real steps toward disarmament.

The coordinated line of the socialist countries was reflected in the Polish proposal to convene a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe, which was submitted to the Madrid forum on 8 December 1980. The countries of the socialist community proposed that the conference be held in two stages: the first for

the discussion of broader confidence-building measures and the further development and reinforcement of corresponding provisions in the Helsinki act, and the second to work out ways of lowering the level and intensity of military confrontation in Europe, including the limitation of military activity and the reduction of armed forces and arms. It was stipulated that the work of the conference would not compete with the subject matter of the talks in Vienna on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe and would not diminish the authority of other bilateral and multilateral talks on arms race limitation and disarmament. Another of the proposal's strong points is that it takes the coinciding views of the participants in the Madrid meeting into account, does not set any kind of preliminary conditions for the conference on military detente and gives all countries a chance to make any kind of comments or proposals on the basis of total equality.

The United States and some of its NATO allies made every effort to refocus the discussion in Madrid from questions of military detente in Europe to questions unrelated to the subject matter of the Madrid meeting and to discredit the idea of convening a conference. The majority of Western European countries, however, displayed great interest in this kind of conference. Support for the idea was expressed in speeches in Madrid by representatives of not only neutral and non-aligned countries, but also some NATO countries, although their position on the matter was inconsistent. In particular, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Colombo stressed that the Madrid meeting represented "a basis for convening a European conference on disarmament, at which time Italy will prove its desire for progress in the extremely complex sphere of military security."¹⁹ The same feelings were expressed by K. Frydenlund, then the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, who assured participants that Norway "supported the proposal to convene a conference on disarmament in Europe." West German Foreign Minister H. D. Genscher stressed that the Madrid meeting should adopt a decision regarding a specific mandate to hold a European conference on disarmament for all signatories of the Final Act.²⁰

The interest of the European states in a conference on military detente is attested to by the proposals put forth on this matter by France (11 December 1980), Yugoslavia (12 December 1980), Sweden (15 December 1980) and Romania (15 December 1980). Besides this, on 12 December 1980 eight neutral and nonaligned European countries (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) submitted their joint proposal on stronger confidence-building measures.

The general NATO attitude toward the conference, which was "adjusted" to make it more rigid under direct U.S. pressure, was stated in the French proposal. It focused on the discussion of only confidence-building measures, which should be "compulsory, verifiable and applicable to the European continent from the Atlantic to the Urals" and should pertain to information aimed at "better knowledge about armed forces, stronger stability by means of the demonstration of conventional military activity and the observance and verification of commitments."²¹ The French proposal did not say specifically that the discussion of confidence-building measures should be followed by a second stage for the discussion of arms limitation and reduction. It is a well-known fact, however, that the original French proposal on the conference on disarmament in Europe, put forth at the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (May-June 1978), specified that the conference should be held in two stages and that "an agreement should be reached on tangible arms reductions within the European geostrategic complex" during the second stage.²²

The "total" reversal of the NATO concept of the conference in favor of confidence-building measures, the hope of using these measures to collect information about the structure and activities of the Warsaw Pact armed forces and the disregard for the main issue--the actual limitation of the arms race and accomplishment of real disarmament--are largely a result of NATO's insistence on viewing the confidence-building measures as a substitute for real disarmament and an attempt to pretend interest in military detente in Europe by exaggerating the importance of these measures.

In diplomatic practice, this approach has been clearly apparent, for example, during the talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe, where the West made its position contingent upon so-called "concomitant measures" unrelated to the problem of arms reduction. It is indicative that articles have appeared in the press in the United States and other NATO countries in recent years which substantiate the thesis that confidence-building measures have priority over measures aimed at real disarmament, attempt to prove their "adequacy" from the standpoint of securing the military balance and so forth.²³

After the United States and its NATO partners had expressed their idea of the conference and had proclaimed it the only acceptable basis for reaching an agreement on the projected conference, they actually continued their attempts to prevent the adoption of any agreement in Madrid on this matter. This was the purpose of the delaying tactics that were widely used by the Western countries and their attempts to turn the forum in Madrid into a kind of verbal bullring and divest the meeting of all its meaning. It is indicative that the United States did not officially support the idea of convening a conference (according to the NATO scenario) until February 1981--that is, during what was already the second stage of the Madrid meeting. The United States did this under strong pressure from the majority of European countries, including some of its allies, in the fear that it would be isolated in Madrid and would completely undermine its prestige.

The Soviet Union, the other countries of the socialist community and several neutral and nonaligned countries made considerable efforts to direct the proceedings in Madrid toward the search for compromise agreements on key questions connected with the projected conference. As a result, just before the meeting adjourned for the summer (28 July 1981), all 35 participating states reached a preliminary agreement on the following important points of the conference agenda:

The conference should be part of the all-Europe proceedings begun in Helsinki almost 7 years ago;

Future measures to strengthen confidence will be significant in the military sense, will be politically compulsory and will be accompanied by the appropriate forms of verification, which will correspond to their content.

Earlier agreements had been reached on the preamble, statements about the general goals and objectives of the conference, its first stage and the transition from the first stage of the conference to the next.

The agreement on convening the conference now depends on an agreement on the geographic boundaries of the confidence-building measures that will be planned at this

conference. This is a major and truly complex question because it touches directly on the security interests of all states without exception.

By a decision of the all-Europe conference, the confidence-building measures agreed upon at that time are conducted within the territory of the European states, including the western regions of the USSR (within 250 kilometers from its western border). At the Madrid meeting the delegates from the United States and other NATO countries immediately began to insist that the zone be extended to the entire European half of the Soviet Union--in accordance with the NATO formula "from the Atlantic to the Urals." Soviet consent to this formula--without any corresponding extension of the zone on the West's side--was put forth as one of the preliminary conditions for the conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe. In this way, the NATO countries tried to ensure in advance that the parameters of future agreements would be exclusively in their interest.

In its approach to this matter, the Soviet Union proceeds from the belief that the zone stipulated in the Final Act for the application of confidence-building measures reflects a carefully considered and verified balance of the interests of signatories and has still not exhausted its potential for the consolidation of stability and security on the European continent. However, the USSR, guided by its desire to eliminate obstacles to the projected conference and demonstrating its goodwill toward the search for mutually acceptable agreements, proposed the considerable expansion of the zone of future confidence-building measures.

The proposal put forth at the 26th CPSU Congress regarding the extension of confidence-building measures to the entire European part of the USSR on the condition of a corresponding extension of the zone on the part of the Western states not only paved the way for a positive solution to the key issue of the Madrid meeting--the question of convening a conference on military detente and disarmament--but also neutralized the American plans to undermine or block the all-Europe proceedings and prevent the adoption of any decisions on the projected conference while simultaneously transferring all blame to the Soviet Union.

The later statement by L. I. Brezhnev in Tbilisi (22 May 1981), that if the Western states were not prepared to specify their response to the expansion of the zone of confidence-building measures in Madrid, they could wait and reply to the Soviet initiative directly at the conference on military detente and disarmament, went even further to restrict the possibility for the United States and some of its allies to continue their previous obstructionist tactics and simultaneously evoked more energetic demonstrations by the European countries interested in convening this kind of conference in favor of a successful outcome of the disagreements over the geographic boundaries of the confidence-building measures.²⁴

As a result, the delegations from the United States and some other NATO countries were faced by a dilemma: They could either continue to delay the determination of these boundaries and assume full responsibility for the breakdown of the Madrid meeting or they could pretend to take concrete actions in this direction. On 20 July 1981--that is, not long before the Madrid meeting was adjourned for the summer, the U.S. delegation officially made the following statement about the zone of the confidence-building measures on behalf of all the NATO countries: "The measures to strengthen trust, security and disarmament in Europe will be applicable

to the entire continent of Europe and, as regards the adjacent sea and air space, to the activities of armed forces located there, to the degree that this activity is part of the activity on the continent that is subject to notification."

It is obvious that this statement expands the zone of the confidence-building measures to the entire European territory of the Soviet Union all the way to the Urals, while in the West it is not subject to expansion and could even be reduced in comparison to the corresponding provisions of the Final Act. In connection with this, it must be said that the zone of the confidence-building measures was clearly and unequivocally stipulated in the Final Act: In particular, it did not speak of the continent of Europe, but of Europe and the "adjacent sea and air space."

According to the U.S. formula, however, the confidence-building measures would encompass only the continental part of Europe; this would actually exclude such island states as Great Britain, Iceland and several others, or, in other words, whole regions with a direct effect on the military-political balance in Europe, from the zone.

As L. I. Brezhnev stressed, however, NATO military preparations in the European zone do not begin and end at the continental edges and, for this reason, "the island territories adjacent to Europe and the corresponding seas and oceans around them and air space above them must also be within this zone."²⁵

Consequently, the American side's attempt to include the statement about the "continent of Europe" in the definition of the zone of application of the confidence-building measures--and to thereby unjustifiably limit the zone on West's side and obtain unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the security of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries--cannot be interpreted as anything other than the overt distortion of the Helsinki agreements on this matter.

Besides this, the U.S. proposal contained an overt attempt to exclude the independent activity of airborne and naval forces from the future confidence-building measures, although it is known that this activity is extremely important from the standpoint of the security interests of all participating states.

Therefore, the American proposal of 20 July 1981 on the zone of the confidence-building measures was not balanced, it seriously distorted the existing provisions of the Helsinki agreements and it openly contradicted the principle of non-aggression against any other signatory. It is not surprising that many participants at the Madrid meeting interpreted this as another U.S. attempt to undermine the work of the forum.

The Soviet Union, seeking positive advances at the Madrid meeting, submitted a new balanced definition of the zone of the confidence-building measures, completely based on the provisions of the Final Act, on 20 July 1981. It stipulates that the confidence-building measures will cover all of Europe with its adjacent maritime (or ocean) regions within the corresponding latitude and its air space. The specific geographic parameters of the zone should be determined at the conference itself on a balanced and mutual basis.

Nevertheless, despite the realistic and flexible nature of our definition, the United States hastened to call it unacceptable because it "contradicts the Western concept of the zone of confidence-building measures" and simultaneously made every effort to promote the NATO definition of the zone by exerting strong pressure on participants at the Madrid meeting. At the same time, the United States resorted to the overt distortion of the essence of the Soviet definition by alleging that the USSR was trying to extend the zone "to the entire Atlantic all the way to Philadelphia" and so forth, although it is a well-known fact that the Soviet Union did not mention the territory of the United States and Canada. It spoke only of all Europe--continental and insular--with its adjacent sea (or ocean) regions in the corresponding latitude and the air space of the part of the Atlantic that is adjacent to Europe.

It is indicative that the American delegation in Madrid, despite all of its attempts to discredit the Soviet-proposed definition of the zone of confidence-building measures, had to take the obvious groundlessness of its position into account and agree at the end of 1981 to exclude the words "continent of Europe" from its definition and include the statement that the confidence-building measures "will be applicable to all Europe." The rest of the American definition, however, remained unchanged, including the exclusion of the independent activity of naval and airborne forces from future confidence-building measures.

Therefore, the destructive position of the United States and its NATO allies is still preventing the Madrid meeting from reaching an agreement on the final document in general and on the zone of confidence-building measures in particular.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are doing everything within their power to surmount obstacles to the successful conclusion of the meeting, so that "when the Madrid meeting resumes its work, the participants can finally move on to the reason for the meeting--to the discussion of security and cooperation in Europe--and so that preparations can be made for a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe, which the people of our continent need so urgently."²⁶

But this does not depend merely on the socialist countries. An equal share of the responsibility must be assumed by the United States and the other Western countries which have not made any constructive response to date.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Madrid meeting began on 11 November 1980.
2. PRAVDA, 30 March 1982.
3. NEWSWEEK, 22 February 1982, p 8.
4. "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye. Sbornik dokumentov" [The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament. Collected Documents], Moscow, 1977, p 91.
5. Ibid., p 92.

6. V. F. Petrovskiy, "For the Implementation of the 'Peace Zone' Concept," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 7, 1982--Editor's note.
7. "Documents of the All-Europe Conference," Helsinki, 1973, p 57.
8. For a more detailed discussion, see V. M. Khaytsman, "SSSR i problemy razoruzheniya. 1945-1959" [The USSR and Problems of Disarmament, 1945-1959], Moscow, 1970, pp 146, 264.
9. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rech'i i stat'i" [Following in Lenin's Footsteps. Speeches and Articles], vol 6, Moscow, 1978, p 560.
10. "UN General Assembly, 34th Session," N.Y., 1979, pp 53, 54 (doc A/34/416).
11. "The Belgrade Follow-Up Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Report and Appraisal. 95th Congress, 2d Session, May 17, 1978," Wash., 1978, p 80.
12. FOREIGN POLICY, No 39, Summer 1980, p 157.
13. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, January 1980, p 23.
14. "Communique Issued at North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on December 14, 1979," Brussels, 1979, p 75.
15. "NATO and Western Security in the 1980's: The European Perception," Report of a Study Mission to Seven NATO Countries and Austria to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 9 April 1980, Wash., 1980, p 54.
16. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, September 1980, p 52.
17. Doc UN A/35/PY.4 (22 September 1980), p 32.
18. FOREIGN POLICY, No 39, pp 154-158, 201.
19. "The 1980 Madrid Meeting," Madrid, 1980, p 38.
20. Ibid., pp 15, 73.
21. "Document of the Madrid Meeting," CSCE/RM/Rev 1 (11 December 1980).
22. "World Armaments and Disarmament," SIPRI Yearbook 1979, Stockholm, 1979, p 505.
23. See, for example, J. Coffey, "Arms Control and European Security. A Guide to East-West Negotiations," London, 1977.
24. PRAVDA, 23 May 1981.
25. Ibid., 3 November 1981.
26. Ibid., 17 March 1982.

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GROWTH OF U.S. ANTIWAR MOVEMENT SINCE 1970's SURVEYED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 15 Jul 82) pp 41-47

[Article by Ye. N. Yershova: "Chain Reaction of the Antinuclear Movement"]

[Text] "The most amazing phenomenon of the new decade"--this is how prominent American diplomat and historian George Kennan described the mass protest movement against nuclear weapons that has engulfed the United States in recent months. The most convincing argument in corroboration of these words was the demonstration of 12 June 1982, when millions of supporters of peace gathered in the streets of New York.

There seemed to be no warning signs of the widespread discontent with administration policy. The President and members of his administration had repeatedly said that the American society had overcome the "Vietnam syndrome" and that, after many years of dissidence and heated debates, a consensus--a general agreement on foreign policy matters--was once again present in the United States. The results of public opinion polls were cited as proof of this, as well as newspaper and magazine articles which allegedly proved that the 1980 election had given Ronald Reagan a mandate to conduct a foreign policy aimed at the achievement of world leadership and military superiority and the escalation of the arms race.

It is true that the polls showed that the number of supporters of increased military spending rose throughout the 1970's--from 11 percent at the beginning of the decade to 74 percent at the end. Around 63 percent of the Americans expressed a willingness to support "any steps by the administration," right up to the use of force, in order to, as the printed survey form put it, "stop the spread of communism." Of course, the interpretation of survey responses is extremely onesided. According to prominent sociologist D. Yankelovich, the data cited above do not by any means attest to "an indiscriminate American desire for armed confrontation." Supporters of the policy of force said nothing about other survey findings, such as those which testified that even at the very height of the massive propaganda campaign to intimidate people with the "Soviet military threat" at the beginning of 1981, when Ronald Reagan's prestige was at its highest point, 60 percent of the respondents still favored the continuation of a policy of detente and talks with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation.

There was also no truth to the statements in the bourgeois press that the antiwar movement was dead and that it had receded into the past forever when the Vietnam

War came to an end. In fact, antiwar organizations conducted persistent, painstaking work throughout the 1970's, mainly on the local level. It was the selfless activity of the fighters for peace that created the necessary conditions and prepared the soil for the current mass antiwar protests.

However, the feelings of large circles in favor of talks with the USSR on the reduction of nuclear weapons and all of the work of the antiwar organizations remained backstage while a militant performance, which was supposed to symbolize the American society's unanimous agreement with White House policy, was played out on the political stage.

The first clouds in the seemingly clear sky were the "teach-ins" on more than 150 campuses in 40 states on 11 November 1981. They reflected the concern of students and instructors about the "inherent danger of nuclear weapons, the growing possibility of nuclear war and the urgent need to reduce this risk," as one protest document said. Familiar names began to be heard again--Harvard, Cornell, Princeton, Yale, Berkeley, Stanford, Columbia, MIT.... They were the ones that had ushered in the mass antiwar movement of the 1960's, and in the 1980's they revealed a new wave of protest. They were supported by less famous universities and colleges--Flemingham, Holy Cross, Lesley, Clark, Haverford and many others in the East; Cleveland, Kansas and Wayne in the Midwest; Arizona, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and others in the West; Southwestern, Texas and Virginia in the South.

The "teach-ins" were initiated by the Union of Concerned Scientists. This prestigious organization, whose members include such famous names as H. Bethe, P. Flory, H. Kendall, G. Kistiakowsky and J. Wiesner, felt it was the scientist's duty to inform the public of the mounting danger of nuclear war and of its possible consequences, which would be catastrophic for mankind. The scientists were supported by 11 other organizations, including the Arms Control Association, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, the Council for a Livable World, the Council on Economic Priorities, the American Federation of Teachers and others. The day of protest on 11 November was scheduled to coincide with a national holiday--Veterans Day--to attract the attention of all the Americans who had fought in wars and had suffered from them ("there will be no veterans after World War III"). According to the BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, what happened on that day "looked very much like the student forums of the Vietnam era"; this sounded the "first clarion call of the movement against nuclear weapons of the 1980's."

The Veterans Day demonstrations took on such large dimensions that reports of them even reached the pages of the "big press," which finally had to admit that a sizeable segment of the American public was not only seriously worried about the danger of nuclear war but was also actively protesting the administration's remarks about the possibility of "limited" nuclear conflict. The reaction of the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE was typical: It reported that "after a decade of hibernation the issue of nuclear arms control has suddenly come to life as a political problem for the average American."

The press also "uncovered" the existence of other forms of antiwar protest. In particular, there were reports that a campaign for a U.S.-Soviet nuclear freeze had been going on for almost a year at the initiative of Randall Forsberg, director of the Boston Institute on Disarmament and Defense. At the beginning

of December 1981 this campaign reached California, the state where the current President's political career began and where he has a solid base of political support. Signatures began to be collected there for a petition calling for a referendum on a freeze on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons, to be conducted in November 1982, at the same time as the congressional election. Other states, counties and cities followed California's example.... The anti-nuclear protest was having a chain reaction.

In April 1982 signatures were already being collected in preparation for referendums in 47 states. In California the petition was signed by more than 700,000 people, or twice as many as the required number for a referendum; one of them was Jerry Brown, the governor of the state.

Many cities held referendums without waiting for November. In the state of Vermont, for example, a referendum was held at the beginning of March, at the same time as the municipal elections. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of 161 of the 192 cities in the state requested the White House to begin talks with the USSR on the mutual cessation of nuclear tests and a freeze on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. The freeze was supported by the inhabitants of 33 of the 44 cities in New Hampshire, where municipal assemblies were held for this purpose. In all, according to TIME magazine, by the middle of March resolutions of this kind had been passed at 257 municipal meetings in New England and had been approved by local government agencies in more than 30 other cities. The legislatures of several states--New York, Massachusetts, Oregon, Connecticut, Vermont, Maine and Wisconsin--also passed resolutions calling for a nuclear freeze under pressure from the voters.

More and more new public organizations are joining the first 75, which supported the initiative of the campaign organizers from the very beginning, and some organizations are being created now expressly for the purpose of activating the public, because "the threat of nuclear war has reached critical mass proportions." These are, for example, Business Sounds the Nuclear Alarm, Artists for the Preservation of Life, Chicago Teachers and Professors for a Nuclear Freeze, United Attorneys for Nuclear Arms Control and others. The membership of existing antiwar organizations has been growing for a long time. For example, the membership of SANE, which has been waging a struggle against nuclear weapons since the end of the 1950's, rose 88 percent in 1981. The dimensions and influence of Physicians for Social Responsibility are growing quickly. In 1979 it was founded by 10 concerned individuals, and now it has 11,000 activists, 85 branches in 45 states and an annual budget of half a million. In the South, where this organization had no support a year ago, it now has 16 branches.

This last fact is quite indicative: This is the first time that antiwar activity has spread to the South, which is traditionally conservative and depends more on the military-industrial complex than other regions. The Pentagon is the major provider of jobs in at least six southern states. But it is precisely here, in St. Louis (Missouri), that the center of the coalition of the campaign for a nuclear freeze is located and is supervising the activities of the movement's 20,000 volunteers who are working in 149 branches in 43 states. The new mood of the southerners was reflected in a statement by South Carolina's Lieutenant Governor Nancy Stevenson. This state produces Poseidon missiles and plutonium for nuclear arms.

"These enterprises have been here for many years," N. Stevenson said, "but I think that people find no comfort in the knowledge that South Carolina plays a much more important role than we would hope in nuclear affairs."

Finally, certain events which were given particularly dramatic and extensive press coverage took place this spring. They were initiated by an organization with the symbolic name "Blast Epicenter," whose main objective is to inform the inhabitants of potential "strategic targets" of what they might expect in the event of nuclear war. Millions, rather than thousands, of Americans are involved in this undertaking. They took part in the week of protest against the nuclear arms race at the end of April and in mass demonstrations, rallies, picket lines and prayer meetings at hundreds of colleges and universities in 650 cities which would be the targets of a nuclear strike if a war should break out.

The events now taking place in the United States within the framework of the current antiwar campaign clearly testify to serious changes in the mood of the American public. According to the LOS ANGELES TIMES, 83.4 percent of the Americans favor the immediate conclusion of a Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreement. In just half a year, between September 1981 and April 1982, the number of those who regard the nuclear threat and nuclear weapons as the most important problem facing the United States increased fivefold. Just last September 58 percent of the respondents were in favor of a larger Pentagon budget, but now 59 percent object to any further increase in military spending. The administration is far from indifferent to public opinion on this matter: After all, Reagan plans to increase military expenditures by 18 percent in the next fiscal year, and he will need the support of Congress to do this.

What is the reason for the rapid change of mood that gave rise to the current wave of protests? According to the White House, the "hand of Moscow" can be seen in all this, and it is all a "communist plot." George Kennan, however, denies these accusations, and it would be difficult to suspect him of communist sympathies. "There is no sense," he wrote, "in labeling the movement a communist plot, as our administration is now trying to do." Of course, the American communists have always taken the most active part in the struggle for peace and they are assisting the current antinuclear campaign, but the movement is made up of people with the most diverse views. Many women's, religious, labor and black associations and many other public organizations which have been fighting against the military threat for many years are active in the movement. Their demands are not confined to a nuclear freeze; they see it only as the first step along the difficult road to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament. Antiwar organizations are also waging a persistent struggle against interventionism in U.S. foreign policy, against interference in the affairs of El Salvador and other Latin American states and against support for the South African racist regime. More than 100 antiwar organizations made preparations for a nationwide demonstration in support of the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, in which American war protesters were joined by representatives of the European movement against the nuclear danger and fighters for peace from Japan and other countries. This demonstration, which brought millions of people together, marked the height of the movement.

Antiwar organizations associate militaristic U.S. foreign policy with the administration's antidemocratic socioeconomic program. For example, a SANE statement

stresses that "the exaggeration of Soviet military strength and American weakness has been going on since the days of the cold war, which began more than 30 years ago.... It has a single purpose--the buildup of U.S. nuclear forces and the escalation of the arms race," which will ultimately lead "to an unprecedented transfer of funds from the taxpayer's pocket and from social programs to military expenditures, which bring us closer to Judgment Day."

Along with confirmed supporters of peace, hundreds of thousands of Americans who never supported the peace movement in the past are now protesting nuclear weapons. The demand for a nuclear freeze is their entire platform. Just yesterday many of them approved of the President's policy, but the fear of global annihilation and the natural desire to feel certain of a peaceful future for their children have had their effect. "The profound fear of nuclear war has been around for a long time," said former MIT President J. Wiesner, "but people only realized the danger after the current administration began to openly speak of the prospect of nuclear war and of (the possibility of) winning this war.... The reaction of the public is not surprising." "Ronald Reagan has scared the people," Senator A. Cranston agreed. The same idea was expressed almost word for word by S. Clyberg, a professor of sociology at a university in Houston: "Reagan has terrified the Americans as well as the Russians." Many such comments can be found in the press. It was precisely these feelings and thoughts that brought people of the most diverse views, social and financial positions and religions into the movement. Summing up these feelings, TIME magazine noted in an editorial on the antinuclear movement, which bore the indicative title "Thinking About the Unthinkable," that its members want to "exert pressure on the hawkish administration to force it to consent to nuclear arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union."

The editorial also spoke of the breadth of the movement's social spectrum: "The supporters of the bilateral freeze on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons include the 'peaceniks' who led the protests against U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War 10 years ago. But the base of the new movement is much broader: It has more bishops than Berrigans,* it has physicians and attorneys with an irreproachable status in the establishment, and it has arch-conservatives along with diehard liberals."

It is true that all strata of American society, including big business, are represented in the campaign for a freeze. But this does not mean that all classes and strata are represented equally. Certain natural characteristics of this stage of the antiwar movement are apparent. First of all, the current rise of the movement clearly reflects a tendency that was seen in the 1950's and 1960's--the growing role of the scientific intelligentsia in the struggle for peace. The problem of social responsibility is now an uncommonly pertinent issue for workers engaged in mental labor. The possibility that American administration policy can be influenced by scientists is quite limited, even in view of the fact that scientists serve as the consultants of various government agencies. Realizing their inability to convince ruling circles of the suicidal nature of their policy, the scientists appealed for support from the general public. This led to the birth of many antiwar groups of

* The Berrigan brothers are two Catholic priests with leftist views who were active in the movement against the war in Vietnam and who advocate nonviolent civil disobedience.

physicians, biologists and physicists in recent years. They want to tell Americans that they are being deceived by the spread of illusions about the possibility of "limited" nuclear conflicts and that only irresponsible people can allege that "you can survive a nuclear war if you have a shovel and can dig a hole quickly enough." The prestige of the scientists has substantially aided the movement in its propaganda and educational work and in the attraction of new members. The experience of Helen Caldicott, Randall Forsberg, Henry Kendall and many other scientists testifies how productive participation by the intelligentsia in mass organizations of the antiwar movement can be.

The second distinctive feature of the current antinuclear protest is the participation of an extraordinarily large group of American churches. Furthermore, these are not only liberal churches and traditional pacifists, such as the Quakers, for example, but also moderate and even conservative churches. Virtually all of the largest American churches--Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox and even Mormon--have issued statements in which they condemn nuclear weapons as something incompatible with Christian doctrine and call upon the public to recognize their "sinful" nature. They are actively supporting concrete steps against the arms race. The National Council of Churches, which unites 40 Protestant churches, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Quakers and others are participating extensively in the campaign for a nuclear freeze. In a number of cases clergymen have gone even further and have asked their parishioners to take concrete action as a sign of protest against the arms race. The appeal of the bishop of Seattle (Washington), R. Hanthausen, for the nonpayment of 50 percent of federal taxes as a sign of protest against the use of these funds for military purposes, had widespread repercussions. The bishop of San Francisco recommended that the medical personnel of California hospitals not carry out the Pentagon's orders on the creation of a special hospital bed reserve, "to avoid creating the false impression that medicine will be able to cope with the consequences of nuclear war." The bishop of Amarillo (Texas), T. Mattison, addressed the workers of a nuclear munitions plant located in this city and asked "everyone connected with the production and accumulation of nuclear weapons...to abandon these duties and seek other work for the good of the world." He created a special fund to assist those who followed his advice. The Mormon Church, which has always regarded loyalty to the government as something just short of a Christian commandment (virtually all of the members of this church voted for Ronald Reagan in 1980), pointedly condemned, according to the WASHINGTON POST, the "horrible arms race" and asked the administration "to find another alternative soon."

Perhaps the most vivid example of the move to an antimilitaristic position was provided by popular evangelist Billy Graham, who was renowned not long ago for his militant anticommunism. Today he is asking the Americans to realize that "peace and the problem of the arms race are vitally important issues.... Christians must work with all people of goodwill--believers and nonbelievers--for the sake of the common goal of peace.... The threat of nuclear or biochemical warfare must mean more than differences in the political or economic bases of society." Billy Graham attended the world conference of "Religious Figures of the World Against Nuclear War" in Moscow this May.

The ice began to break even on Capitol Hill under the influence of the mass protest demonstrations, the resolutions of state legislatures, collective petitions and the

personal letters and phone calls from voters. At first individual voices cautiously expressed approval of the campaign for the freeze (at the end of 1981 this idea was supported by 25 legislators), then draft resolutions began to be submitted in the Congress. In March of this year alone, three resolutions connected with this campaign were submitted in the Senate. The first of these, written by Senators E. Kennedy and M. Hatfield, asked the President to work toward a U.S.-Soviet nuclear freeze; it quickly won the support of dozens of senators and over 150 members of the House of Representatives. Another resolution, submitted by Senator C. Mathias, goes even further: It demands that Ronald Reagan immediately resume strategic arms control talks with the USSR. "We must resume the talks and conduct them seriously and purposefully until there are no more strategic nuclear weapons," the senator said.

The third resolution, whose authors were Senators J. Warner and H. Jackson, also mentions the freeze and even a reduction of nuclear arms. Its actual purpose, however, is to deflect the wave of mass protests and divest the movement of what is essentially its basic demand. The fact is that it proposes the elimination of U.S. "strategic vulnerability" as a preliminary condition for the freeze. Therefore, this appeal for a freeze is only camouflage for a projected continuation of the arms race. Nevertheless, even this resolution is indicative: Today even some "hawks" are trying to attach themselves to the antinuclear protest movement.

It should be borne in mind that the congressional reaction is also connected with the upcoming election in November of this year. The mass campaign for a nuclear freeze is being conducted in around 300 of the 435 electoral districts. The significance of the election factor is compounded by this year's reapportionment of districts. Many congressmen, even those with considerable seniority in the Capitol, will find it difficult to deal with an unknown or little known constituency, especially one with antiwar inclinations.

Just as in the 1960's, the American people are objecting to the administration's foreign policy. Their protests have already acquired such large proportions that the Congress and the administration cannot ignore them. The growing movement against the nuclear arms race and the danger of suicidal war has become a tangible political factor in the United States.

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U.S.-GREEK FRICTIONS OVER NATO, TURKEY, CYPRUS EXAMINED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 15 Jul 82) pp 47-51

[Article by Ye. I. Yurkov: "United States-Greece: Washington Is Maneuvering"]

[Text] Secretary of State A. Haig's trip to Athens in the second half of May redirected the attention of the American and international public to American-Greek relations. A new stage in the relations between these two countries began at the end of 1981. The parliamentary election in Greece on 18 October 1981 dealt a crushing blow to rightwing forces in this country. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), headed by Andreas Papandreu, won around 48 percent of the vote and 172 of the 300 seats in Parliament, which made it possible to form a one-party government with a strong parliamentary majority. This changed the Greek political order to which the United States had become accustomed--an order in which the ruling parties were backed up by the oligarchy and had no broad party framework or low-level organizations. The different structure of the new ruling party and the personal prestige of A. Papandreu have limited Washington's ability to exert "inside pressure" on the new Greek government.

The formation of a socialist government in yet another NATO country and the new domestic political situation in Greece have disturbed and worried people in Washington. Papandreu's campaign statements about his hope of revising the conditions of Greek participation in NATO and the EEC and about the possibility that American bases in Greece might be dismantled and nuclear weapons might be removed from its territory were interpreted by Americans as something just short of a "direct threat to the United States," which has assigned its military facilities in Greece an important role. They are supposed to secure the actions of the Sixth American Fleet in the East Mediterranean and serve as the center of communications with the Middle East and Persian Gulf zone. The system of bases on Crete, including the naval base in the Gulf of Suda, the airports for heavy cargo aircraft and the stations for U.S. communications with Israel, Egypt and the Persian Gulf, is particularly valuable to the United States.

Even during the election campaign in Greece, the Americans were worried that a PASOK victory could endanger U.S. "vital interests." A report prepared by the U.S. Congressional Research Service included "American influence in Greece, American-Greek relations and Greece's relationship to NATO" among these important matters. The report spoke of the importance of "preventing any kind of movement

within Greece in the direction of neutralism and of withdrawal from the general Western security system."

The American press recalled that A. Papandreou had lived in the United States from 1939 to 1959, became an American citizen and had a respectable academic career in that country: Prior to his return to Greece, he was the dean of the School of Economics at the University of California in Berkeley. The press warned Washington against the temptation of "taking a hard line in relations with Greece," however, because this could "push Papandreou further to the left and ignite nationalist feelings in Greece."

The concrete foreign policy actions and steps taken by the Papandreou government since the election have proved that although it is willing to make some concessions to the United States (for example, decisions on the country's withdrawal from the NATO military organization and from the EEC and on the liquidation of American military bases and American nuclear weapon depots have been shelved), it is pursuing an independent course in relations with other countries.

The United States was obviously dissatisfied with the Papandreou government's criticism of American military-political strategy and the U.S. approach to relations with the Soviet Union. Former NSC staffer S. Larrabee had this to say about the Greek government's behavior in this area (in an article published in FOREIGN POLICY, No 45): "Papandreou does not share the Reagan Administration's demonic view of the USSR and will probably pursue a more balanced policy in relations with the Soviet Union than his predecessors."

At a meeting of the NATO defense ministers in Brussels in 1981, A. Papandreou, who had retained the defense portfolio, refused to sign a communique that did not guarantee the safety of Greece's eastern borders against Turkey. In January of this year the Greek government refused to support the points of a resolution of the EEC foreign ministers' conference that "condemned" the USSR and called for vigorous anti-Soviet action in connection with the events in Poland. In March the Greek government was one of the first in the West to applaud the Soviet decision to impose a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the Soviet Union. Besides this, Greece expressed its own opinion at a session of the nuclear planning group in Colorado Springs and refused to support the actions taken by the United States and several other countries to create a so-called "multinational force" to oversee the Sinai Peninsula in accordance with the Egyptian-Israeli separate treaty. Furthermore, Athens granted diplomatic status to a PLO representative.

All of this aroused the frank discontent of the U.S. administration, which took several steps to direct Athens' policy into a "more moderate" channel and to stimulate pro-American feelings in the Greek leadership. Greece became the direct object of Washington pressure. In particular, the American press began to spread the rumor that American military bases in Turkey were now of much greater value than U.S. facilities in Greece and that Spain's membership in NATO would supposedly diminish Greece's significance as the main base of the American Sixth Fleet. "The Reagan Administration is just as belligerent as Papandreou and will have difficulty keeping its composure," the WASHINGTON POST warned, for example.

High-placed U.S. officials were instrumental in the campaign of pressure on Greece. The "warm atmosphere" of C. Weinberger's visit to Turkey in December 1981, in contrast to the guarded nature of the American administration's first contacts with the members of the new Greek government, was supposed to show Athens that the tendency toward better and deeper American-Turkish relations was growing stronger in White House policy and that the tactic of balancing between Greece and Turkey, a tradition founded by H. Truman, was being abandoned.

In connection with this, it is significant that an American-Turkish agreement on "cooperation in the area of defense and economics" was signed in March 1980, in accordance with which the United States was officially authorized to use some military bases in Turkey after promising to give that country extensive financial and military assistance. This completely cancelled the American embargo on military shipment to Turkey, which had been imposed on Ankara as a means of leverage in connection with its policy on the "Cyprus question,"* and this essentially signified Washington's approval of this policy.

The unsettled nature of the "Cyprus question" is another area of serious friction in American-Greek relations. Papandreou's visit to Cyprus in the beginning of 1982 demonstrated the firm stand the PASOK government was taking in its attempts to achieve the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus at any cost. Greece's tougher stand on the "Cyprus question" shattered the U.S. hopes for the rapid implementation of the "Rogers Plan," envisaging the resolution of Greek-Turkish conflicts and Greece's return to the NATO military organization on certain compromise conditions.

Oil drilling rights on the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea became a pertinent issue again. Besides this, Greece returned to its demand for exclusive control over the air space over the Aegean and, at the beginning of the year, considered the possibility of instituting a 12-mile zone of territorial waters around the Greek islands, which would give it control over 65 percent of the Aegean and would leave Turkey in control of only 10 percent. As a result, Greek-Turkish conflicts continued to represent a determining factor in the situation in the East Mediterranean, and this is putting the strength of NATO's southern flank in question.

The events following the "Cyprus crisis" of 1974, when U.S. military-political ties with Turkey and Greece were severely strained, showed NATO the danger of a conflict between the Balkan members of this organization. The widespread condemnation of the American position in the Greek-Turkish conflict at that time in Greece was one of the main factors motivating even Prime Minister C. Karamanlis, who had adhered to a pro-Western course, to decide that the country should withdraw from the NATO military organization. Under present conditions, the exacerbation of Greek-Turkish relations could have a particularly injurious effect on Greek ties with the United States and NATO because, on the one hand, the present Greek government could give in to the wishes of broad segments of the population and, on the other, the current American-Turkish rapprochement could make Greece suspect that the United States is taking a more pro-Turkish stance.

Washington also cannot ignore the fact that the exacerbation of Greek-Turkish conflicts would considerably reduce Washington's ability to fuel anti-Soviet feelings

* See V. S. Shein, "Congress and U.S.-Turkish Relations," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 5, 1976--Editor's note.

in Europe. A new flare-up of the Greek-Turkish conflict would make the thesis about the "threat to the Balkans from the North" appear even more unconvincing and would give neutralist feelings a broader and stronger base in southern Europe. It is no coincidence that some circles in Greece are already considering the possible formation of some kind of group of neutral and nonaligned states in the Balkans.

The exacerbation of the "Cyprus problem" could threaten the survival of English military bases on the island, which, as a report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and entitled "Turkey, Greece and NATO: Tension in the Alliance" says, "are important to the United States because they are used by American aircraft stationed there for reconnaissance activity."

Therefore, within half a year after the socialist government took power in Athens, the U.S. administration had encountered several problems connected with American-Greek relations and with the Cyprus and Aegean conflicts. Besides this, Athens' relations with the Western European NATO countries, which Washington has always regarded as additional guarantees of the retention of Greece in the Western orbit, have cooled down perceptibly.

All of this made American-Greek relations the subject of quite heated debates between the U.S. executive and legislative branches when the question of military aid to the countries of NATO's southern flank--Greece and Turkey--was discussed in congressional committees in April of this year. The Reagan Administration announced its intention to increase military aid to Turkey to 465 million dollars in fiscal year 1983 (343 million this year) and to allocate Greece the previous sum of 280 million. Several senators objected to this on the grounds that it would complicate relations with Greece. For example, P. Sarbanes (Democrat, Maryland) said that increased aid to Turkey could undermine the important talks on American bases in Greece. He proposed a corresponding increase in military aid to Greece. He was supported by R. Lugar (Republican, Indiana).

The American administration's plan to increase military aid to Turkey at a time of tense Greek-Turkish relations, threatening the strength of NATO's "southern flank," has been criticized by some groups in the United States. According to advocates of the "balanced" approach, the problem could be solved by working out new, more convenient terms of Greek membership in NATO and the EEC, making certain concessions with regard to the status of American military bases in that country, similar to those made in Turkey, and restoring the previous balance in quantities of American military aid to Greece and Turkey.

Alexander Haig's trip to Greece this May indicated that the United States is evidently inclined to take precisely this approach. Despite the essential lack of discussion of major problems in U.S.-Greek relations and the postponement of their resolution, this brief visit marked the beginning of an American-Greek dialogue. This is also attested to by the fact that the United States made a definite concession regarding increased military aid to Greece. Besides this, the Pentagon's decision to supply the Greek Navy with "Harpoon" missiles was recently announced.

Reversals of this kind of Washington policy, from the practice of "penalties," which have become a favorite method of U.S. foreign policy in recent years, to a more flexible line, including maneuvering in its interrelations with NATO partners, reflect the U.S. desire to keep its position on NATO's "southern flank" from growing weak.

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CONFERENCE OF YOUNG SCHOLARS OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 15 Jul 82) pp 54-55

[Article by A. I. Nikitin]

[Text] In March 1982 the Council of Young Scholars of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, held a conference of young Moscow scholars of American affairs to discuss the results of the Reagan Administration's first year in office.

Speakers analyzed the current American administration's activity within the general context of the widespread conservative resurgence that marked the sociopolitical, cultural and psychological atmosphere of the United States in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

During the discussion of economic affairs, reports were presented by post-graduate students from the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies (ISKAN), A. M. Belov, A. I. Izyumov, S. S. Turunov and K. E. Sorokin. They discussed the Republican administration's attempts to reorganize the mechanism of state-monopoly regulation and to weaken the means of intervention in market relations. They noted that the growth of military spending is posing a threat to the attainment of the administration's projected goals. The planned increase in the military budget is considerably in excess of the income derived from GNP growth and reduced federal spending (this reduction is primarily a result of cuts in various social programs). This means that a balanced federal budget cannot be expected in the future. The considerable expansion of military production poses the threat of a new spurt of inflation.

The discussion of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy and ideological strategy was conducted by A. V. Kortunov, A. I. Nikitin, A. B. Pankin, I. Ye. Malashenko, S. A. Karaganov, V. V. Potashov (ISKAN) and V. N. Nikonov (MGU [Moscow State University] imeni M. V. Lomonosov). They said that the administration had declared the reinforcement of American might to be its most important goal, but there is no unanimous opinion with regard to Washington's foreign policy in the circles on whose political support Ronald Reagan relies. Whereas the supporters of the so-called libertarian current of conservatism are advocating an isolationist foreign policy, many neoconservative ideologists favor an even more energetic and rigid foreign policy. Representatives of both of these currents, however, display unconcealed hostility toward the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Regional aspects of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy and foreign economic policy were discussed by A. Vishnevskiy (Institute of African Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences), P. G. Litavrin, A. G. Kvasov (ISKAN), A. N. Zagorskiy (Moscow State Institute of International Relations, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and S. M. Malyutin (Institute of Oriental Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences). Speakers stressed that this policy, just as the policy of earlier presidents, is inconsistent with the situation in the developing countries and is not helping them solve their problems. In Latin America, in the Middle East and in other regions, Washington is unceremoniously trying to interfere in the affairs of other states and to dictate its own terms and wishes to them. This behavior has aroused increasing opposition by the people of these countries.

The experiment in the comprehensive study of the economic, political, ideological and psychological situation in the United States proved to be quite productive during the course of this scientific gathering. The conference strengthened contacts between specialists in various fields. Participants considered the creation of an inter-institute research group of young scholars, who would coordinate the efforts of young specialists from the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, the MGU, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Institute of Comprehensive Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Philosophy, USSR Academy of Sciences, and other scientific centers in the comprehensive study of contemporary international relations.

This group has been created and is already at work.

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REAGAN POLICIES TO INSURE RAW MATERIAL SUPPLIES EXPLAINED

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[Article by B. P. Sitnikov: "Materials and Minerals Policy of the Reagan Administration"]

[Text] One of the most important elements of the Reagan doctrine of "American survival" is the concept of the "new beginning," which also covers U.S. materials and minerals policy. In essence, this policy consists in declaring an "era of struggle" for resources outside the United States and the large-scale mobilization of internal mineral potential. Its goal is the material security, by any means, of the Republican administration's economic and military-political strategy,¹ aimed at the consolidation of U.S. leadership in the capitalist world.

'New Beginning'

The relative deterioration of the position of American monopolies in the world in the 1970's gave rise to a desire to resurrect the time when the United States could practice virtually unimpeded expansion in the nonsocialist world. Increasingly loud voices are demanding the protection of the interests of American multinational corporations by the government, including protection by military force, to oppose the developing states' attempts to establish national sovereignty over their own natural resources and the increasing competition of the developed capitalist countries.

These demands became even stronger when it turned out that all of the attempts made by the American administration in the 1970's to work out an effective raw materials policy and heighten national self-sufficiency in this area had not produced the desired results. The United States is now not only importing around 40 percent of the oil it needs, but is also importing more than 50 percent of 24 of the 32 most important minerals. For example, it imports 100 percent of the niobium, mica and strontium it uses, 98 percent of the manganese, 97 percent of the tantalum and cobalt, 93 percent of the bauxite, 98 percent of the chromium, 91 percent of the platinum, 84 percent of the asbestos, 82 percent of the fluorine, 77 percent of the nickel, 62 percent of the zinc and 54 percent of the gold. According to reports in the American press, many of the metals imported by the United States are irreplaceable in the production of most types of weapons and are used mainly in the military sector. It accounts, for example, for more than

40 percent of all the titanium and gallium used in the United States, more than 30 percent of the germanium and thorium and around 20 percent of the cobalt and copper.

It must be said, however, that the United States' present dependence on foreign sources of various minerals stems largely from socioeconomic factors rather than natural or geological ones. American monopolistic capital has its own considerable resources of scarce minerals but prefers to use the much cheaper foreign raw materials.² The race for profitable foreign sources of raw materials was one of the main reasons for U.S. economic expansion, and later for its political expansion. This was due to the neocolonial hope of controlling the foreign natural resources that have become the cornerstone of American foreign policy in recent years.

At the same time, this largely artificial increase of American economic dependence on foreign sources of crude minerals has led to a situation in which, for example, the United States imported more than 29 billion dollars' worth of non-energy producing minerals in 1980. According to the latest available data, U.S. raw material imports, including oil, cost around 110 billion dollars in 1981.³ This is putting a heavy burden on the country's balances of trade and payments and is one of the main reasons for their chronic deficit. As a result, the raw material issue has acquired political overtones.

Considering, in particular, the increasing political importance of this problem, the Republican Party included a section on "energy supplies and access to raw materials" in its 1980 campaign platform, in which special attention was given to "guaranteed deliveries" of strategic minerals from other countries. When Reagan took office, his administration formed a special group to study legislative and administrative measures in this sphere.⁴ In December 1980 the group submitted a plan to the President, consisting of three basic measures: the relegation of questions connected with minerals to the status of state priorities and the coordination of their resolution on the presidential level; the considerable augmentation of strategic material reserves; the stimulation of mineral exploitation on federal lands. Later events showed that this plan subsequently formed the basis of the Republican administration's materials policy.

This is the suitable time for a reminder that when the Truman Administration was making active preparations for a "preventive war" against the Soviet Union 30 years ago, it also worked out something like a "new beginning" in U.S. raw material policy: the so-called "Paley Plan" (named after the chairman of the President's Materials Policy Commission). This plan, which was pretentiously entitled "Resources for Freedom," was already proposing that the problem be solved in three ways: the augmentation of local materials production by eliminating various technological and economic barriers; the modification of consumption standards by replacing scarce materials with more readily available ones; increased imports of raw materials on terms convenient for the United States.⁵ However, at a time when American monopolies were discovering rich deposits of oil, uranium, copper, diamonds and other valuable minerals in the colonial and semicolonial countries and were commencing their predatory exploitation, the only recommendation that was actually followed was the last one, which was then materialized in the program for the purchase of raw materials abroad and the creation of strategic reserves.

The approaches of the Truman and Reagan administrations to the raw material problem are similar. At the same time, an extremely important new feature is now apparent. This is the politicization of the problem, which has made it a cardinal area of state policy. This stems, in particular, from the change in the international situation, which is now distinguished by a stronger battle by the developing countries to establish national sovereignty over their natural resources.

At the beginning of 1981 a special interdepartmental Group on Natural Resources and Environment was formed on Reagan's orders to formulate a state materials policy. Its members were the secretaries of the treasury, interior, agriculture, housing and urban development and energy and the U.S. attorney general. The group was headed by Secretary of the Interior J. Watt. In hearings before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in March 1981, Watt announced his wish to assume the leading role "in making a state policy which places special emphasis on the strategic significance of minerals."⁶ This "strategic significance" stems, in particular, from the fact that the new series of qualitative improvements in various types of weapons and the enhancement of their mobility and fuel efficiency will, according to American experts, increase the demand for light-weight metals. A higher demand for some metals will also be the result of the rising requirements regarding the durability and rust- and heat-resistance of military equipment and munitions. Consequently, such elements as manganese, chromium, cobalt and tungsten, which produce such properties when they are combined with steel, are in greater demand in the military-industrial complex.

The basic outlines of this policy had been formulated within a year, and on 5 April 1982 the President submitted his "National Materials and Minerals Program Plan" to the Congress. When he handed this document over to the Congress, Reagan said that "this policy is a response to the American need for measures to reduce material vulnerability by giving private businessmen an opportunity to preserve and expand our minerals and materials industry."⁷

According to the administration's plan, the most important elements of the new materials policy will be the augmentation of strategic reserves, guaranteed freedom for private companies to work minerals on federal lands and the stimulation of private capital investments in raw materials production.

Augmentation of Reserves

"The security of overseas sources of raw materials can no longer be ignored," the plan stresses. "We approve of the policy of accumulating reserves in sufficient quantities to satisfy military, industrial and civilian needs and to safeguard national defense in times of crisis."

We should recall that a program for the accumulation of strategic raw material reserves was drawn up in the United States after World War II. In accordance with the 1946 act on strategic and scarce material reserves, the federal government had two main duties: to acquire and accumulate scarce materials if the country had no natural reserves of these materials or if reserves were insufficient to satisfy wartime requirements, and to stimulate the prospecting and extraction of scarce materials within the country.⁸

A list of 52 materials subject to accumulation, for a sum of 3.7 billion dollars (in 1949 prices), was drawn up in accordance with this law. Furthermore, the list was drawn up with a view to the accumulation of primarily the materials that were either not produced in the United States or cost much more in the domestic market than in the world market. As a result, strategic reserves began to be created primarily through deliveries from foreign sources.

The list of strategic materials and reserve norms were revised several times in subsequent years in line with changes in U.S. domestic and foreign policy. For example, whereas the 1946 law based strategic reserve norms on the requirements of a 5-year war involving the use of conventional weapons, in 1958 the government revised these norms with a view to a 3-year war. The reserve levels were lowered by 60 percent. In 1973, when the federal budget deficit was growing rapidly, the government set new norms in accordance with the requirements of 1 year of war. The norms were raised once again in 1976, when the fuel and energy crisis broke out, to meet the requirements of a 3-year war involving the use of conventional weapons. The list of strategic and scarce materials subject to accumulation now consists of 93 items (80 minerals and 13 types of agricultural raw materials), 68 of which are either partially or completely imported by the United States.⁹

When President Reagan took office and his administration resolved to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, an active campaign was launched in the United States for the considerable augmentation of strategic reserves.

This campaign was quite zealously supported by the American Mining Congress, and later by the Cast Iron and Steel Institute, the American Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers and dozens of leading companies in the mining, metallurgical and processing industries.

In the Congress the campaign was first headed by J. Santini, a Democratic congressman from Nevada. As the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Mines and Mining, he concluded after a fact-finding tour of southern Africa in January 1980 that the mineral resources of South Africa were of particular interest from the standpoint of strategic reserve augmentation and that their significance had been underestimated by strategic planning experts in the Carter Administration.¹⁰ It is precisely with the aid of imports from Africa, he stressed, that the United States covers most of its need for manganese, cobalt, chromium and platinum and half of its need for 23 of 36 other minerals. In this connection, AMERICAN OPINION reported that "in 1978 southern Africa supplied the United States with more than 50 percent of its imported chromium ore, platinum and ferromanganese, more than 80 percent of its imported vanadium and almost the same share of its ferrochromium and a considerable portion of its shipments of diamonds (for industrial use), asbestos and feldspar."¹¹

American officials have said that raw materials not produced in the United States will be given primary attention in the accumulation of reserves. For example, when J. Watt addressed the Senate in March 1981, he stated that the first reserves to be augmented would be reserves of chromium, platinum and cobalt, which are needed by the American military industry, especially its aerospace sector. Furthermore, it was reported that platinum would probably be purchased from South Africa, cobalt from Zaire and Zambia and chromium from South Africa and Zimbabwe.

In March of last year the Reagan Administration was already announcing that 100 million dollars would be allocated for the first large purchase of strategic materials in the last 20 years, with 78 million earmarked for cobalt. The General Services Administration, which is in charge of the accumulation and maintenance of strategic material reserves, announced the projected purchase of around 54.5 tons of cobalt. It is also considering the accumulation of supplementary reserves of aluminum oxide (from Ghana), bauxite (from Guinea), manganese oxide (from Gabon and South Africa), vanadium (from South Africa) and industrial diamonds (from Zaire, Angola, Namibia and South Africa). The administration has requested the Congress to immediately allocate 2.14 billion dollars for this purpose. These allocations are expected to increase in the next few years. Purchases of raw materials will be stretched over several years to avoid a significant rise in world raw material prices.

The details of the policy of strategic reserve augmentation are still being worked out, but it is already clear that the Reagan Administration will rely heavily on South Africa as a source of scarce materials.¹²

Mobilization of National Resources

The President's "National Materials and Minerals Program Plan" says that the administration plans to accelerate the investigation of federal lands where mineral prospecting is prohibited and to "cancel the obsolete directives on the closure of these lands." The document also says that the government will consider public recommendations regarding the particular federal lands that should be open to mineral prospecting and mining and "concentrate on these regions without delay."

Even before Ronald Reagan entered the White House, the prevailing opinion in the United States was that one of the main reasons for the exacerbation of the raw material problem in the country was the previous policy of the federal government, which was aimed at restricting the exploitation of mineral resources in the public domain.¹³ According to American estimates, more than 70 percent of the nation's mineral resources are concentrated in these territories. When the previously mentioned J. Santini addressed the Senate Subcommittee on International Economic Policy in 1981, he said that the "current resource policy is still inhibiting the local production of minerals and metals." He called the prohibition of mineral prospecting and mining on federal lands and "excessive government regulation" the two main reasons for the nation's dwindling output of crude minerals. The same conclusion was drawn by the General Accounting Office,¹⁴ a special report of which says that the conservation of huge areas in the public domain and the cancellation of mineral leases "were instrumental in the reduction of local oil and gas production and the rise in their import costs from 4.6 billion dollars in 1972 to 80 billion in 1980." The report says, in particular, that the conservation of just 8 million hectares in five states (Colorado, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico and Wyoming) reduced the annual petroleum output by almost 50 million tons and the gas output by 4.4 billion cubic meters for a total sum of 11 billion dollars (in 1981 prices).¹⁵

According to AMERICAN OPINION magazine, "in 1964, when the national park act was passed, only 14 percent of the public domain was closed to mineral prospecting and mining, but now the exploitation of minerals is prohibited or severely restricted

on approximately 70-75 percent of this land, representing one-third of the territory of the United States, or an area equivalent to the territory east of the Mississippi."¹⁶ One of the latest examples of this kind of restriction was the Alaskan land conservation act signed by President Carter at the end of 1980, which made more than 61 million hectares of Alaskan land part of the national park system and, consequently, prohibited mineral prospecting and mining here.¹⁷

When Ronald Reagan took office, his administration began to revise its predecessors' policy of resource conservation. When Secretary of the Interior addressed delegates from the American Mining Congress in May 1981 (in St. Louis), he said: "We must make fundamental changes in the methods of managing our natural resources if America wants to survive as a free country with a strong national defense and freedom for the individual."¹⁸ It was at that time that a program of specific government measures for the mobilization of national resources was proposed. It consisted essentially of the following three aspects: an inventory of national mineral resources; the opening of federal lands to mineral prospecting and mining; the leasing of mineral-bearing lands on a broader scale.

Resource Inventory: "If we want to rebuild this great country, we must know the extent of our resources. We must take an inventory of American lands. At present, we do not know our mineral potential.... We do not know the scales of our oil and gas resources."¹⁹ This is how J. Watt assessed the state of affairs in this area a year after he had been appointed the head of the Department of the Interior, which manages U.S. natural resources.

There seems to be a certain element of deliberate overdramatization in this assessment, which is apparently necessary to the administration for specific political reasons. We should recall that the U.S. Geological Survey prepared around 400 maps of the mineral resources on the nation's continental territory just in the 1970's. This virtually completed the geological mapping of the United States.

The situation is quite different, however, with regard to the mineral resources of the continental shelf. The mineral potential of these lands is actually almost unknown. The United States owns 405 million hectares (1 billion acres) of territory on the continental shelf. In 1953 the federal government began to lease sections of the shelf to private companies for mineral prospecting and mining. During this time, 17.8 million hectares of the continental shelf were offered for lease, but only 8.1 million were leased (it is here that 9 percent of all the oil and around 23 percent of all the natural gas is produced in the United States). Furthermore, only 4 million hectares, or 1 percent of the U.S. continental shelf, can be described as more or less well explored from the geological standpoint. "We do not know the state of the remaining portion of this billion acres," J. Watt said.²⁰

An analysis of the "National Materials and Minerals Program Plan" indicates that the natural resources of the continental shelf will be of primary importance when the inventory is taken. This is attested to, in particular, by the government's projected broad-scale mineral lease program.

Opening of Federal Lands: An important element of the Republican administration's new materials policy is the plan to grant private companies broader access to minerals in the public domain. For example, the President's plan stresses that

"new mineral deposits will not be discovered until the private sector starts searching for them, and it is in the national interest to stimulate this search. The government, as the owner of most of our best mineral-bearing lands, must minimize the unnecessary restrictions that are inhibiting this exploration.... The preservation of national parks, for example, is an important goal, but it must be balanced with other goals, such as national security."

The federal government owns 308 million hectares of land (the total continental territory of the United States covers an area of around 917 million hectares). According to American estimates, 70-75 percent of this territory, as mentioned above, is partially or completely closed to mining as a result of the federal government's policy of resource conservation. For example, according to American statistics, by the middle of the 1970's, 10 million hectares of federal lands made up the national park system, around 76 million hectares were national forests and more than 11 million were national preserves. Besides this, 117 million hectares were reserved for classification by the federal government. As a result, 214 million hectares, or around 70 percent of the public domain, were completely or partially unavailable for mining.

When J. Watt was appointed secretary of the interior, he authorized the prospecting of strategic minerals in the public domain and stopped the classification of federal lands as national parks and preserves. At the beginning of 1981 the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior announced that around 61 million hectares had been "released" from consideration as reserve territories. The administration's explanation for these actions was that prospecting for oil and other minerals in the public domain had to begin immediately to prevent the inevitable panicked assault on these lands in the future if their mineral resources should remain inaccessible.

Broader-Scale Leasing: According to government estimates, only 324,000 hectares of the 40.5 million hectares of federal coal-bearing lands, or less than 1 percent, have been leased.

When the Republican administration took the reins, it accelerated the issuance of leases to private companies on federal lands with oil, gas and coal deposits, drafted a bill authorizing the leasing of land with mineral deposits in preserve territories and submitted it to Congress (after encountering fairly strong opposition in Congress, however, the administration agreed to a compromise and announced that the leasing of these lands would be postponed until the end of 1982). The Department of the Interior also drew up a plan for the 1982-1986 period, according to which around 81 million hectares on the continental shelf would be offered for lease each year. This means that 405 million hectares, or the entire shelf territory, would be offered for lease within 5 years. Corresponding measures would be taken to expand the practice of taking bids for shelf leases. Prior to 1981, the Department of the Interior took bids only five or six times a year.²¹

Improvement of the 'Investment Climate'

The present administration has assigned the stimulation of capital investments in the mining industry a special place in the efforts to mobilize national mineral resources. The urgency of this problem is attested to, for example, by a report

of the congressional subcommittee on mines and mining, published at the end of 1980 under the title "The Materials Vulnerability of the United States: the Significance of National Policy." It stresses that mining is one of the most capital-intensive branches of industry. The cost of some projects in this branch can exceed a billion dollars. At the same time, intersectorial balance data indicate that the ratio of fixed capital value to the new product in mining is the highest in the 24 leading branches of American industry. This is why American experts are unanimous in the opinion that the demand for capital in this branch will rise constantly in the next few years.

According to the administration's plans, the significant reduction of corporate taxes that is part of Ronald Reagan's general economic strategy should play an important part in the improvement of the "investment climate" in this branch. Furthermore, several special measures are planned for mining, as the most capital-intensive branch. For example, Congress is considering a group of financial and tax incentives, which are alleged to be necessary for U.S. self-sufficiency in the sphere of raw material supply. The first item on the list is a group of measures to ensure sizeable depletion allowances,²² which give mining companies the option of not paying taxes on a significant portion (up to 50 percent) of their profits and reinvesting a certain percentage of their taxes in the prospecting and exploitation of new deposits. As a result, total deductions of this kind can exceed the cost of investments in fixed capital several times over during the period of deposit exploitation. For example, oil companies were able to deduct a sum 19 times as great as the original cost of their fixed capital, and sulfur companies deducted a sum 200 times as great.²³

By the beginning of the 1970's, however, there was a tendency to reduce or even cancel depletion allowances. For example, a 1969 tax law left this deduction in force, but lowered the average rate for the branch to 22 percent of the gross income of mining companies. In 1975, at the height of the energy crisis in the nation, this deduction was cancelled for seven of the largest oil monopolies, and its gradual reduction to 15 percent over a period of 10 years was planned for all other oil and gas companies. One of the reasons for this tendency was the increasingly obvious ineffectiveness of this form of tax incentive for capital investments in the branch. American researcher T. Page had this to say about the situation: "On the whole, all of these deductions reduce the real tax norm. Let us assume, for example, that the real tax norm for the mining industry is 10 percent of its gross income while it is 40 percent for other industries. Market forces will strive to equalize the net income norm. This means that the gross income norm in the processing industry will be much higher than in the mining industry. Consequently, these branches will function on different efficiency levels."²⁴ In connection with this, it is significant that it is precisely these differing efficiency levels in the processing and mining industries that establish the necessary conditions in the capitalist society for structural crises, including fuel and raw material shortages. According to American economists, the indirect government subsidization of mining in the form of depletion allowances has raised the prices of minerals produced in the United States to far above the optimal level. When oil price controls,²⁵ which accounted for around 80 percent of all depletion allowances, were lifted in 1981, U.S. ruling circles evidently believed that this situation could be corrected.²⁶

The administration views the lowering of environmental protection standards as another possible way of stimulating investments in mining. Mining is known to be

one of the more "dirty" industries. As a result of the environmental protection laws passed in the United States in the 1970's, the cost of combating pollution rose sharply in the branch and represented 8 percent of all capital expenditures on the average over the last 10 years (19 percent in the case of nonferrous metals), while the indicator for all American industry was only 6 percent.²⁷

The administration also regards the relaxation of leasing terms as a factor that could be instrumental in improving the "investment climate" in the branch. For example, the Department of the Interior is considering the postponement of the exploitation of leased deposits for 20 years instead of 10 and the reduction of the lessee's mandatory annual output to 1 percent of the estimated mineral reserves instead of 2.5 percent.²⁸

According to the "National Materials and Minerals Program Plan," the government also supports the idea of free access to mining branches for international capital for the purpose of stimulating "open" international competition in the working of mineral resources, including resources on U.S. territory. For this purpose, the principle of "equal opportunities" for American and foreign mining enterprises, operating within the United States and abroad, is to be established. Besides this, the administration hopes to exchange information about current scientific research and development in the raw material sphere with other industrially developed countries.

American ruling circles realize that U.S. leadership in the capitalist world cannot be maintained and strengthened without the stabilization and revitalization of the nation's economy, which will demand the resolution of the raw materials problem. This problem, according to the present administration, should be solved not through the development of mutually beneficial cooperation with the countries exporting raw materials, but through the exertion of pressure in the foreign policy sphere (the creation of "rapid deployment forces") and the "mobilization" of internal mineral resources. At the same time, as attested to, for example, by the conference of the heads of state and government of eight developed capitalist countries and 14 developing states at the end of last year in Cancun (Mexico), increasingly loud voices can be heard in the international arena, calling for a realistic approach to the world situation and suggesting that the severe raw material problem not be solved by means of authoritarian or dictatorial behavior, but by means of mutually beneficial cooperation with the exporters of raw materials, moving in the direction of a "new international economic order." As a speaker stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, "the reorganization of international economic relations on a democratic and equal basis is historically inevitable.... We are prepared to help, and we are helping, in the establishment of fair international economic relations."²⁹

FOOTNOTES

1. See "Economic Strategy of the Republican Administration," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, Nos 9, 10, 1981, and the article by V. V. Zhurkin, "The Republican Administration: The Engineering of Military-Political Strategy," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 11, 1981--Editor's note.
2. For example, resources of such scarce and almost completely imported raw materials as cobalt, vanadium and platinum amount to 764,000 tons, 9.07 million tons

and 9,144 tons respectively in the United States (1976 data), which would be enough for many decades if the present level of U.S. consumption should remain constant ("Mineral Trends and Forecasts. Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior," Wash., 1979).

3. MINING ENGINEERING, May 1981, p 506; VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, June 1981, p 517; "Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1981," Wash., p 755.
4. The group is headed by D. McMichael, president of the Council on International Affairs in Pittsburgh. Its members also include Director W. Mott of the Council on Economics and National Security, Director F. Shakespeare of the Committee on the Present Danger, Chairman M. Weidenbaum of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, prominent businessman and brother of the vice-president P. Bush and the presidents of the largest mining companies.
5. "Resources for Freedom," The President's Materials Policy Commission (The Paley Commission), vol 5, Wash., 1952, p 819.
6. THE MINING RECORD, 11 March 1981, p 2.
7. "National Materials and Minerals Program Plan," Wash., 1982, p 1.
8. For a more detailed discussion of this program, see A. A. Danilova, "Strategic and Scarce Material Reserves in the United States," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 2, 1977--Editor's note.
9. AMERICAN OPINION, October 1981, p 33.
10. A special government report prepared for J. Carter stresses, for example, that "minerals from southern Africa are of great, but not decisive, importance to the West."
11. AMERICAN OPINION, October 1981, p 29.
12. This matter is discussed in detail in the survey by Ye. N. Kondrashov, "United States-Africa: The Raw Material Aspect," in issue No 7 of the magazine for 1982--Editor's note.
13. For more detail, see issue No 2, 1982, pp 117-124--Editor's note.
14. The main functions of this office are the supervision of federal programs and the recommendation of ways of heightening the efficiency of government measures.
15. THE MINING RECORD, 11 February 1981, p 12.
16. AMERICAN OPINION, October 1981, p 21.
17. AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS JOURNAL, January 1981, p 5.
18. Ibid., July 1981, p 33.

19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. MINING ENGINEERING, September 1980, p 1345.
22. A specific percentage ratio used in the calculation of the taxes owed by mining companies. For example, whereas the tax formula for other industrial companies is $(x-y) \cdot t$, where x stands for gross profits, y stands for production outlays and t stands for the overall taxation norm (48 percent), for the mining companies the formula would be $[x-(x \cdot n)-y] \cdot t$, where n stands for a percentage deduction for depletion. In this way, taxes are lowered for these companies to attract capital to the mining industry.
23. P. Stern, "The Rape of the Taxpayer," N.Y., 1973, p 237.
24. T. Page, "Conservation and Economic Efficiency. An Approach to Materials Policy," Baltimore and London, 1978, p 135.
25. L. N. Karpov, "Cancellation of Price Controls on Oil and Petroleum Products," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1981--Editor's note.
26. A genuine outbreak of "oil fever" began when government oil price controls were lifted in the United States. Around 3,000 new companies for the exploration and production of the "black gold" were founded there in just 1980 and 1981. The price of oil in the country quickly flew up to the world level of around 40 dollars a barrel (159 liters) in 1981. Whereas the number of newly drilled oil wells in the record year of 1955 was 2,686, in 1981 it was around 3,970. As a result, the proportion accounted for by local oil in total consumption rose from 48 percent in 1977 to 64 percent in 1981 (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 2 April 1982, p 9).
27. AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS JOURNAL, June 1981, p 32.
28. FORTUNE, 30 November 1981, p 147.
29. "Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 15.

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U.S. JOURNAL'S POLEMICS ON REAGAN FOREIGN POLICY VIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 15 Jul 82) pp 71-74

[Article by N. N. Sokov: "ORBIS on American Foreign Policy"]

[Text] The debates that are being conducted in American scientific journals over aspects of the present administration's foreign policy are reflected in ORBIS, a magazine issued by the Institute of Foreign Policy Studies (Philadelphia). The last issue of this magazine for last year particularly aroused the interest of researchers and analysts. The first reason was that it came out with the name of a new chief editor on the cover. Judging by a brief article in the magazine, Alan Sabrosky, just as the previous editor W. Kintner, who adhered to conservative views in general, fully approves of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy aims. This issue of the magazine was also interesting, however, because, in spite of the conservative nature of the organization that publishes the magazine and the conservative views of the new editor, it contains quite different ideas about U.S. foreign policy and almost diametrically opposed opinions. The articles in this issue of ORBIS¹ touch upon the most urgent international political issues: arms control and problems in Soviet-American relations--political and commercial.

Several authors--C. Marshall, A. Sabrosky, retired French General P. Galloise and others--are fully in support of the foreign policy conducted by the Reagan Administration and its declared goals: to augment the U.S. role in the world, to regain U.S. leadership among the capitalist countries and to dictate U.S. terms to the socialist countries, including the USSR, from a position of strength.

Former Admiral of the U.S. Navy E. Zumwalt writes: "There is no question that a successful long-range policy will depend on the government's ability to negotiate from a position of strength.... The Reagan Administration has begun to restore this position both in words and in actions."² Unconcealed reliance on the buildup of military potential has become a priority, while arms control is regarded as a possible element of national security and not as a goal with any kind of intrinsic value, A. Sabrosky states.³ In other words, under President Reagan, arms control is regarded as one way of attaining the administration's chief goal--military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The authors express great "concern" over the increasing independence of the developing countries, particularly those which have been the Western countries'

suppliers of raw materials and energy resources. These authors are particularly irritated by the fact that the former colonies have relied on the support of the Soviet Union in their struggle for economic independence and their objections to the practice of stealing their natural resources with impunity. "Today everyone knows that the Western industrial powers are struck by paralysis," P. Galloise writes, "when they encounter the demands of countries possessing energy resources and raw materials. It is absolutely clear that any intention to use force will immediately send the threatened state into the socialist camp."⁴ In connection with this "threat" to the West, some authors, such as Hudson Institute researcher K. Payne, sees no reason not to use nuclear blackmail. Furthermore, he implies that "there is the great probability that the United States will have to resort to nuclear threats to avoid defeat in a regional crisis."⁵

The conservative authors realize that the United States' positions in today's world are somewhat weaker. They blame this on the imaginary U.S. "lag" in the sphere of strategic and conventional weapons. Others add real factors to the list of reasons--the more important role played by other states in the world arena and the increasing economic and political independence of America's allies. Noting that "the United States is less able to direct events in line with its own taste," A. Sabrosky writes that the present state of relations with allies demands that their interests be taken into account.⁶ But these authors regard the buildup of arms in all areas as the chief method of regaining the United States' leading role in the nonsocialist world.

At the same time, several of the authors express the opinion that it is precisely the hard line of the present administration that is keeping the United States from attaining its desired goals and that Washington should conduct a more flexible policy, which must include the renunciation of confrontation, the relaxation of tension in Soviet-American relations and the normalization of relations with other socialist countries.

Director R. Platig of the U.S. State Department's office of long-range forecasting and research discusses the need to prevent crises in the developing countries in his article and advocates U.S. cooperation with the USSR in this area. The ideological and political differences between the two countries, the author says, should not stand in the way of the implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutual trust between these powers, because they have a common goal--the preservation of peace as an essential prerequisite for the survival of life on earth. This, according to Platig, could constitute the basis for mutually acceptable standards of behavior by states in the world arena. "Mutual trust," he writes, "can only grow out of common experience and a common understanding that both superpowers recognize the most fundamental principles of international politics in the nuclear era and will adhere to them.... These are the same principles that made the Helsinki agreement possible and it is on these principles that the future development of peaceful relations in Europe will depend."⁷ Peace is also being endangered, the author says, by the kind of conflicts in the Third World countries that could grow to the point at which the leading powers could become involved in the conflicts on opposite sides. He suggests that conflicts of this kind between the USSR and United States could be prevented by active dialogue between the two countries on all levels, including the highest.

Former Director P. Warnke of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency also arrives at the conclusion that U.S.-Soviet talks leading to mutually acceptable agreements are necessary. His article in the same issue of ORBIS discusses the future of NATO in connection with the question of the new American medium-range missiles. In particular, he expresses the opinion that the deployment of American cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe could have a negative effect on NATO security and he asks the administration to take a constructive approach to the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe.⁸

It is indicative that some months after this issue of ORBIS came out, an article written by some extremely famous authors, who had occupied prominent government positions in the postwar years and still have considerable influence in the foreign policy establishment--G. Kennan, M. Bundy, R. McNamara and G. Smith--appeared in FOREIGN AFFAIRS magazine.⁹ The authors of this article admit that the United States has "stated its intention to be the first--and has actually worked out plans to be the first--to deliver a nuclear strike" throughout the postwar period.¹⁰ This U.S. strategy, the authors say, should be totally rejected, because it will lead to total war and will intensify existing differences in the North Atlantic alliance to the danger point. The authors insist that NATO accept the Soviet proposal regarding no first use of nuclear weapons. "The time has come," the article says, "to realize that no one has ever been able to cite any convincing arguments in favor of the view that any use of nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, can actually remain limited. All serious analyses and all military doctrines of the last 25 years plus indicate that even the most limited use of these weapons on the battlefield will result in incalculable losses and the destruction of civilian property."¹¹ The decision to build up American nuclear forces on the European continent is severely criticized in this article and is described as a way of destabilizing the situation in Europe.

Soviet-American relations were also the subject of another article in ORBIS, but this time they were discussed from the standpoint of the administration's policy on Cuba. The author of this article is Ohio State University Professor D. Schulz. He argues against the policy of rigid confrontation and pressure that has been conducted by all U.S. administrations in relations with Cuba. The policy of force in relations with Cuba, the author writes, has always produced results contrary to American interests. He proposes the abandonment of this line and the development of relations with Cuba in all areas. Censuring Washington's attempts to suppress national liberation movements in any part of the world at any cost, Schulz points out the tendency of U.S. foreign policy to become "instinctively involved in conflicts affecting East-West relations and fueling hatred." This "forces the Soviet Union and Cuba to respond" to this policy in a like manner, he writes. The actions of the United States, the author says, have led to the expansion of many conflicts and crises that it has then blamed on the Soviet Union. The author concludes that threats and the policy of escalating conflicts must be replaced by diplomatic methods and that political solutions must be substituted for military solutions to problems arising in the world.¹²

Of course, these recommendations are contrary to the U.S. line of supporting the most reactionary regimes throughout the world and the U.S. attempts to gain advantages in strategically important regions and consolidate these advantages with a military presence.

These ideas are expressed in an article about Soviet-American economic relations by Professor A. Klinghofer. Although the article formally deals only with one aspect of the problem, connected with energy resources, he examines it through the prism of the entire spectrum of trade relations. One of the main obstacles to the development of trade, he says, was the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (adopted in 1974 and still in force), which "turned out to be a double-edged weapon." The author shows how U.S. ruling circles restricted the possibilities for the development of economic relations with the USSR by their increasing limitation of trade.¹³ "Any American economic sanctions against the USSR," A. Klinghofer writes, "work against the United States, because the Soviet Union then purchases more equipment and technology from the Western European countries and Japan. In this way, American firms lose contracts to their competitors."¹⁴

Therefore, all of these articles indicate that there are different, and sometimes even opposing, views on the present administration's foreign policy within the U.S. foreign policy establishment. While rightwing and conservative circles continue to oppose the policy of detente and the normalization of Soviet-American relations, some American politicians and scholars are insisting on the need to relax international tension and to restore Soviet-U.S. relations in all areas, including the resumption of political dialogue and commercial contacts, and are pointing out the futility and danger of Washington's present policy line.

FOOTNOTES

1. ORBIS, Fall 1981.
2. E. Zumwalt, Jr., "The Reagan Strategic Program and Foreign Policy," ORBIS, Fall 1981, pp 505-510.
3. A. Sabrosky, "Cold War II? A Cautionary Note," ORBIS, Fall 1981, pp 496-501.
4. P. Galloise, "The Soviet Global Threat and the West," ORBIS, Fall 1981, p 651.
5. K. Payne, "Deterrence, Arms Control, and U.S. Strategic Doctrine," ORBIS, Fall 1981, p 751.
6. A. Sabrosky, Op. cit., p 499.
7. R. Platig, "Crisis, Pretentious Ideologies, and Superpower Behavior," ORBIS, Fall 1981, pp 511-524.
8. P. Warnke, "Theater-Nuclear Forces and NATO Security," ORBIS, Fall 1981, pp 501-504.
9. M. Bundy, G. Kennan, R. McNamara and G. Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1982, pp 753-768.
10. Ibid., p 754.
11. Ibid., p 757.

12. D. Schulz, "The Strategy of Conflict and the Politics of Counterproductivity," ORBIS, Fall 1981, pp 679-714.
13. A. Klinghofer, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Energy Predicament," ORBIS, Fall 1981, pp 557-578.
14. Ibid., p 569.

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U.S. PAPERS CITED ON REASONS FOR HAIG RESIGNATION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 15 Jul 82) p 74

[Article by V. G.: "A. Haig's Resignation: Foreign Policy Crisis"]

[Text] Editorials in the NEW YORK TIMES and WASHINGTON POST unequivocally associate Alexander Haig's resignation from the office of secretary of state, announced on 25 June, with a crisis in U.S. foreign policy.

In particular, the NEW YORK TIMES remarks: "Is the Reagan Administration really interested in nuclear arms control or is it obsessed with the idea of a new arms race? What does it want: to deal with the Soviet Union as the leader of an existing alliance or to sacrifice NATO's unity for the sake of ideological purity? Does it know how to balance support for Israel with efforts to win the friendship of key Arab countries? Is it trying to do anything other than to fuel anticommunism in the Third World? The fact that there is ample reason to ask all of these questions indicates the scales of the failures of the Reagan team's foreign policy."

The WASHINGTON POST expresses the opinion that the main reason for Haig's resignation was differences of opinion within the administration over the "gas for pipes" transaction. "Trade is of economic and political value," the newspaper remarks in this connection, "but it is just as valuable to the Western partners as to Moscow.... Furthermore, the pipeline is not an issue of the moment, but one of the central issues both for the alliance (Western--V. G.) and in East-West relations." A. Haig, according to the WASHINGTON POST, realized this, but the President and his closest advisers disagreed.

Commenting on the appointment of G. Shultz to take Haig's place,* the WASHINGTON POST wrote that the two "are men who hold the same views and come from the same circle: They are members of the foreign policy establishment with a great deal of experience abroad and extensive knowledge of overseas affairs, they are globalists who recognize the growing U.S. responsibility for the world order, and they are conservatives who consider the use of American force to be necessary, but they are also realists who know that American potential might be considerable but it is not unlimited."

* For some background material on George Shultz in connection with his appointment as secretary of the treasury in the Nixon Administration, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 5, 1973, pp 122-125.

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STATE LEGISLATURES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 15 Jul 82) pp 112-120

[Article by V. A. Savel'yev]

[Text] One of the specific features of American politics is the constant fierce struggle over states rights. Many American political scientists believe that states play the deciding role in the functioning of the entire current system of authority. What are the specific elements of this role?

First of all, it is the states that indirectly control the nomination and election of U.S. senators (prior to 1913 the senators were actually elected by state legislatures); the position of the state party organization is also often the deciding factor in the election of members of the House of Representatives. State party organizations have more resources (finances and personnel) at their disposal than the national committees of the Republican and Democratic parties. There are also many more "cushy" bureaucratic jobs within the states than on the national level. A party that loses support in the states is doomed to extinction, while the loss of positions in Washington, whether it is the Oval Office in the White House or the majority in Congress, means that the role of this party in the central machinery of state will be weakened only temporarily.

Finally, it is precisely the state party organizations that have utilized the primary election procedure in recent years to advance the particular politician that ruling circles have later regarded as a suitable candidate for the presidency.

All of this explains the interest in the activities of the power structure in the states, especially the legislatures--the state legislative assemblies--which constitute the key element of this structure.

The state legislatures are something like a paradigm reflecting the most important changes in the functioning of American bourgeois democracy.

The state legislatures are not static institutions. Today's legislatures are perceptibly different from their predecessors of the 1960's. Every event and process of the last two decades--both international detente and the rightward shift of the national leadership at the end of the 1970's, both the deterioration of U.S. positions in the world arena and the erosion of the traditional bases of the two-party

system, and both the war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal--left an imprint on these representative bodies. After all, from the vantage point of the ruling class, the reason for their existence consists in adapting the mechanism of public administration to the requirements of the day, ensuring the interconnection of domestic and foreign policy and exerting ideological influence on the masses with the aim of preserving and consolidating the class supremacy of the bourgeoisie.

It is precisely on the level of the state legislatures that the machinery of government is first altered--often by means of trial and error--and later adjusted to fit the changes taking place in American society. These changes include the lower percentage of the American population engaged in agriculture--from 20 percent in 1940 to less than 5 percent today. Another change was the assumption of the urban way of life by the majority of Americans: Over four-fifths of them now live in cities and suburbs, and more than half live in cities with a population of over 50,000. Another change was the tendency of the population to move out of city centers to suburbs, which intensified urban blight. Another was the transformation of the formerly rural southern states into an industrial region--that is, the urbanization of the South, accompanied by changes in its role in national politics. The legislatures were also affected by such diverse phenomena as the rising educational level of Americans, the more active involvement of women in production and politics, the rise of television to the place of honor among the mass media and the increasing influence of noncommercial groups among lobbying forces (consumer protection groups, environmental protection groups, governmental reform groups, etc.).¹

Therefore, the belief that state legislative assemblies (or legislatures) are a secondary political element in comparison to the U.S. Congress is just as erroneous as the view of the states as the backyard of American politics. Suffice it to say that many seemingly "provincial" phenomena that come into being in the states often evolve into nationwide phenomena. For example, direct elections of U.S. senators were instituted in individual states long before the adoption of the 17th amendment to the constitution; in the same way, the state of Wyoming was the pioneer in granting women the right to vote, which was later secured in the 19th amendment; an indicative event of recent years is the campaign for tax cuts that grew out of California's "Proposition 13." Many of the organizational and ideological changes that were brought into the White House by ex-state Governors J. Carter and R. Reagan were also born on the local level.

It is also significant that many congressmen in Washington are former state legislators. Of the 74 members of the U.S. House of Representatives who were elected for the first time in 1980, 33 were once members of state legislatures.² This reflects the continuity and community of the legislators' political standards.

The interconnection of federal and state politics stems largely from the fact that federalism is one of the most important constitutional legal principles of American government.³

Federalism is often called a double form of government, marked by the functional and territorial division of authority. This division of authority is specifically reflected, for example, in the fact that the central government, and not the states, is responsible for the issuance of money, while it is the states, and not the federal government, that make laws regulating marriage and divorce. Finally,

federal and state authorities must work together in specific spheres, such as special federal aid programs, in accordance with which a state receives funds only for precisely defined projects and on the condition that these projects meet federal standards and requirements (for example, education grants are received only by districts with desegregated schools) and with proportional financial participation by the states (the states pay 1 dollar for every 3 federal dollars spent on highways).⁴

The federal form of government structure is still based on the principle of complete state authority with the exception of only the clearly stipulated powers which, according to the 10th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, are delegated to the United States. The federal government organization, personifying the centrifugal tendency, the tendency of states to retain a certain degree of independence, thereby "cancels" some nationwide conflicts between various factions of ruling circles. By relegating their resolution to the state level, the bourgeoisie accomplishes both the actual division of administrative labor and the expanded representation of various groups that have not been allowed to approach the central feeding-trough. According to American researchers, "behind the facade of federalism, financial, military and other powerful elites attain their goals because they can use private concentrated power against public diffused power."⁵

The states have the power to regulate intrastate commerce, the establishment of local government agencies, the maintenance of public health and law and order, the amendment of state constitutions and the ratification of amendments to the U.S. Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states. The President of the nation is elected by the electoral college, where the representation of each state is equivalent to the number of its senators and members of the House of Representatives in the federal capital. The states determine the boundaries of electoral districts.

According to the U.S. Constitution, part of the legislative authority of Congress is exercised jointly with the states. This applies to industrial and social legislation, the management of federal and state lands, laws on transportation, etc. Furthermore, the 10th amendment to the constitution stipulates that all powers not delegated to the United States are "reserved" to the states. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed the existence of these sovereign state rights by ruling that several powers cannot be delegated by the states to the federal government.

However, the constitution also limits the powers of state legislatures: They cannot enter into treaties, coin money, issue bills of credit, make ex post facto laws or laws violating contract obligations, lay duties on imports or exports without the consent of the U.S. Congress or keep troops in peacetime (art 1, sec 10); the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statement on "due process of law" (14th amendment) prohibits the states from passing laws in violation of the Bill of Rights.

American experts on government affairs regard the statement about the "supremacy of federal laws" as the "heart of the constitution" with regard to states rights. If a state law contradicts a federal one, the latter is considered to be "the supreme law of the land." This allows the U.S. Congress to control interstate commerce, currency and credit operations, the system of weights and measures, communications and foreign and military affairs.

State constitutions also impose some limits on the authority of legislatures. First of all, there are the "bills of rights," which are based on the federal model as a whole but with some differences. A few examples of this type should suffice. In particular, fishing on government lands is stipulated in the California Constitution as a "right" of the citizens of this state, and in Tennessee the right to sail on the Mississippi River has been declared "inalienable." Some constitutions contain amendments defending the right of labor to organize or, conversely, anti-labor amendments specifying the right to "refuse to organize."

Secondly, most constitutions prohibit the passage of "local" or "special" laws which pertain to a single person, a single corporation or a single administrative body and are therefore intended not to apply to the entire state or to all of its citizens. These provisions were instituted to combat the widespread corruption and favoritism of the last century. Legislatures can only pass "general laws," which pertain, for example, to all corporations of a certain type rather than to a single corporation. However, although this limited the abuse of power to some extent, it did not put an end to it, because a legislature can always give a "specific" bill an "all-encompassing" appearance.

Thirdly, state constitutions sometimes regulate the legislative procedure considerably.

Fourthly, constitutions limit the financial powers of legislatures: They can limit the right to collect taxes by stipulating maximum tax rates, exempting certain groups or institutions from taxation, etc.; they can specify the maximum state debt; they (or state laws) can stipulate that a certain portion of tax revenues will be used to, for example, finance education or highway construction. In many states these kinds of continuous allocations and resources for special funds constitute half or more than half of all expenditures (for example, 70 percent in Oregon), which limits the legislature's control over state budgets.

Finally, the constitutions of one-third of the states envisage direct voter participation in the legislative process in the form of the "popular initiative" or referendum. In the first case a certain percentage of the voters (usually from 5 to 10 percent of the registered voters) petition for a law or a constitutional amendment, which is then voted on in the legislature or by the public in the next election. In the case of the referendum, it is most often constitutional amendments that are put to the vote. The terms of the referendum change from one state to another: In some the legislature decides which matters should be included in a referendum, but in others the voters can use the referendum to repeal an existing law. On the whole, the initiative and the referendum are used relatively rarely, and usually only when the legislators want to relieve themselves of the burden of responsibility for an important decision by transferring it to the voters. It is indicative, in particular, that the growing antinuclear movement in the United States is resorting widely to precisely these forms of social protest.

There is no question that the prevailing tendency today in the development of the American federation is one toward centralization and standardization, dictated by the economic requirements of state-monopoly capitalism. It does not mean, however, the uncontrolled, onesided growth of government power only in Washington. It is being accompanied by the growth of the power of states, which acquire more resources,

spend more and employ more people with each year. It is interesting that the state budgets have grown more rapidly than the federal budget in the postwar years. For this reason, the proportion accounted for by federal revenues in all government income, including state and local revenues, decreased from 65.3 percent in 1950 to 58.7 percent in 1978, with a corresponding decrease in the federal share of expenditures from 60.3 percent to 53.7 percent. Furthermore, direct state expenditures, which were only one-fourth as high as federal expenditures in 1950, were equivalent to more than a third of the federal figure in 1975. Since the second half of the 1970's, total state and local government expenditures have been constituting a sum comparable to the federal figure.

This tendency will most probably grow even stronger in connection with the "new federalism" program of the Reagan Administration, which has proposed, in particular, the restriction of the growth rate of federal spending: from 17.4 percent in 1980 to 10.4 percent in 1982 and 4.5 percent in 1983.

Whereas the number of federal employees ranged from 2.5 million to 3 million between 1951 and 1981, the state and local government staff increased from 4 million to 13 million during the same period. The largest is the local bureaucracy.⁶ Although state finances as a whole cannot compare to federal finances, the states spend more on education, social welfare, highway construction and maintenance and hospitals.⁷

Ruling circles have an interest in maintaining state power on an adequate level for a specific reason. The American public believes that social problems are solved better in the states than on the federal level. According to a 1979 Harris poll, 59 percent said that state governments were the "best" administrators, while only 29 percent awarded top honors to the federal government. Furthermore, 71 percent stressed that state authorities could solve local problems more effectively than the federal government, because they were better informed and act more "openly," and only 16 percent disagreed with this opinion.⁸ In connection with this, it is also noteworthy that the respondents had a more favorable view of state legislatures than of the U.S. Congress (a positive assessment was given by 31 percent and 19 percent respectively, and negative assessments were given by 61 and 76 percent), although the Americans essentially awarded all legislative bodies a "vote of no confidence."

In the last two decades the state legislatures have played a more important role in the political process. Above all, they have overseen the activities of state executive offices more actively. This was facilitated greatly by the modernization of the legislative procedure: the cancellation of several constitutional limitations on legislature activity, a higher salary and longer work hours for legislators (a longer session and more committee work) and the expansion of the auxiliary staff of legislatures (from an increase in the number of experts and employees to the introduction of the latest information analysis equipment). Legislatures are also paying more attention to the implementation of federal programs connected with the redistribution of allocations. In recent years federal assistance has accounted for 25-40 percent of state budget income. Each year the number of states which, according to the data of the National Conference of State Legislatures, can effectively control and redistribute these funds, increases. The decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Shapp v. Sloan case, which

confirmed the constitutional right of the legislature to manage all state funds regardless of their source, was of fundamental importance in connection with this. The U.S. Supreme Court let this decision stand.⁹

What kind of matters are discussed in legislatures? This can be judged, for example, by a review of the activities of the Kentucky General Assembly, which was examining the state budget for 1980-1982.¹⁰ After approving the budget, the legislature determined the allocations for education, science and art. Gasoline and mineral taxes were raised to increase revenues. The legislature drafted some constitutional amendments and ratified a new juvenile criminal code. Questions connected with environmental protection and energy were prominent on the agenda. The legislators also made changes in regulations governing bank interest rates, granted small businesses additional privileges and amended labor legislation.

According to a survey of 1,256 state legislators in the 1970's, the most important political matters of concern to legislatures were, in order of their importance, finances, taxes, education, management, business, elections, land use, environmental protection and so forth. It is indicative that the three leading areas (finances, taxes and education) were connected with the largest items in state budgets.¹¹ The growth rate of state budgets is also significant: For example, the Oregon budget quintupled over the decade, although the rate of population growth during this period was only 20 percent.¹²

From the standpoint of the legislatures' potential ability to solve these problems (although this might not coincide with their actual effectiveness), the legislatures of California, New York, Illinois, Florida, Wisconsin, Iowa, Hawaii, Michigan, Nebraska and Minnesota ranked highest in the 1970's. The bottom 10 legislatures "in terms of legislative ability" were mainly southern--Alabama, South Carolina, North Carolina, Mississippi, Georgia, Arkansas, Arizona, Wyoming, Delaware and Montana.¹³

Representation in state legislatures has always been marked by clear class features. For example, the state senates were originally frankly regarded as the citadels of the American aristocracy. For this reason, at the end of the 18th century the property requirements for senate elections were two or three times as high as the requirements for the lower house in the states of Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia and Delaware. Most of the states set higher age requirements and longer terms for the upper houses than for the lower ones.¹⁴

The old tradition of gathering and strengthening the political elite in representative bodies is still in force. The best evidence of this can be found in the social composition of legislatures. Most legislators are already members of the elite before their election. They have a higher income than the "average American," a better education and many relatives in politics.¹⁵ Even according to official data, businessmen generally make up more than a third of the state legislators, and most of these are insurance and real estate brokers and bankers. In the Midwest and South, where there are fewer large cities, farmers take the place of businessmen in the state capitals. For example, they hold more than 25 percent of the mandates in Idaho, Iowa, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota.

Although attorneys represent less than 1 percent of the American working public, they account for a much higher percentage of state legislators--22 percent on the average, according to data for the 1970's.¹⁶

The typical American legislator, according to statistics, is a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant male. The proportions accounted for by racial, ethnic or religious minorities in the legislatures are much smaller than their proportions in the working-age population. For example, in 1975 there were 276 black Americans in 48 state legislatures. This is eight times as many as in 1960, but it is far below the proportion accounted for by the black population in most places. Just as in the past, the most pronounced violations of the hypothetical "equal representation" are found in the upper houses; in the middle of the 1970's, for example, there was not a single black legislator in the senates of such large states as Texas and South Carolina.¹⁷

Just as in the past, women are poorly represented in the legislatures. In spite of their more vigorous struggle for equal rights, they occupied only 6 percent of the legislative seats in the 1970's.

The gradual eradication of party boundaries in recent years has naturally affected state legislatures. More and more candidates prefer to run as independents, and party organization and discipline are suffering from erosion almost everywhere. Even in states like New Jersey, where the party organization is comparatively strong, members of legislative assemblies do not always follow party instructions. "As legislators, we must forget our political party ties. We become super-professionals and super-specialists. According to the prevailing opinion, however, it is impossible to simultaneously be a professional and a politician"¹⁸--this is how F. Rock, chairman of the Illinois State Senate, explained his departure from party commitments.

This sometimes leads to party alliances that seem paradoxical to bourgeois observers. For example, at the end of 1980, 28 Republicans in the California Assembly (lower house) united with 23 Democrats to elect Democrat W. Brown, a black liberal, the speaker of the assembly. The Republicans had a selfish motive to assist the splinter group of the divided Democratic faction (23 against 23, with 1 abstention). In exchange, they received the right to appoint the chairmen of several committees, the guaranteed retention of the existing auxiliary staff, equal funds for the analysis of district reapportionment plans and so forth.¹⁹

Throughout the 1970's the Democrats held the majority in the state legislatures that they had acquired at the beginning of the decade. The 1980 election, in spite of all the Republican Party's efforts, did not make any significant changes in these legislatures. The Republicans were able to increase their representation by 200 seats (of the 5,900 up for re-election). As a result, Republicans accounted for 39 percent of all the mandates (7,482) in all state legislatures. This gave the Republicans control over 17 senates and 17 lower houses, while the Democrats retained the majority in 31 senates and 32 lower houses.²⁰

The perceptible Democratic majority in the state legislatures reinforces the Democratic position on the national level. In particular, the Democrats can use their numerical superiority to change the boundaries of electoral districts for

elections to the U.S. House of Representatives. This is done at the end of each decade in line with the latest population census. According to former Chairman W. Brock of the Republican National Committee, the previous "alteration" of district boundaries at the beginning of the 1970's cost the Republicans almost 40 seats in the House of Representatives because the process was controlled by the Democrats. Nevertheless, the Republicans lacked only 27 mandates for a majority in the House after the 1980 election (counting the special 1981 elections in five districts): The Democrats held 243 seats, the Republicans held 191 and there was only 1 "independent."²¹

The Republicans decided to minimize the risk of injury from reapportionment and to acquire at least 12-15 new seats in the House. The party leadership believed that obvious abuses of power by Democrats could be avoided if Republicans could control the gubernatorial seats (they now hold 23 of the 50) or the majority in at least one legislative chamber. This could frustrate Democratic plans. However, in the states (41) where the legislators determine the boundaries of new districts (special committees do this in the other states), the Republicans were theoretically able to prevent Democratic manipulations in 22 but gained complete control only in 3.²²

It should be noted that changes in the party balance in states constitute a much slower and less dramatic process than on the federal level, according to American authorities who analyzed the election results over more than a century and a half. Significant and long-term shifts in control over administrative bodies in the states and the transfer of power from one party to another are always the exception rather than the rule. The relative stability of the party balance in the states, particularly in recent decades, signifies, according to political scientists from the inter-university consortium of political and social studies (Ann Arbor), that only extraordinary circumstances and situations just short of national crises can bring about large-scale changes in the balance of power between the Democratic and Republican parties in the states.²³

After the data of the 1980 population census were published, the northeastern and midwestern states lost 17 seats in the House of Representatives to southern and western states. The most sizeable losses were suffered by New York (five seats) and Pennsylvania, Illinois and Ohio (two each); the biggest winners were Florida (four seats), Texas (three) and California (two).

These are not the final data because the courts are now investigating more than 20 suits against the Bureau of the Census in connection with "losses" of minority voters (it is known, for example, that the bureau "lost" 2.5 percent of the population during the 1970 census).²⁴ Furthermore, these errors were not proportional: Census takers lost track of 7.7 percent of the black Americans and only 1.9 percent of the whites. These obvious signs of discrimination are contrary to the 1965 law on voting rights and the Supreme Court decisions of the 1970's on the formation of electoral districts with a "reasonable" population balance. Whatever people may have to say about the "computer revolution" in the apportionment process, "computers do not make policy," as one specialist from the state of New York said. This means that party, regional and inter-monopolistic conflicts will unavoidably affect the new geographic political boundaries. Even if the courts should call for a recount of the votes in some election results, this, according to estimates, will either

make no changes at all in the redistribution of state seats in the U.S. House of Representatives or will affect only one seat.

The beginning of the reapportionment process clearly demonstrated the advantages of the Republican Party. The Republicans were aided primarily by the tendency of the population to move out of the large cities and northern states traditionally controlled by Democrats to their sphere of domination--the suburbs and the "sun belt" states. Nevertheless, according to expert estimates, money was the main reason for the Republican successes. It was precisely due to the larger sums spent by Republicans that the number of governors from their party almost doubled after the 1978 and 1980 elections (from 12 to 23) and that Republicans won around 500 additional mandates in state legislatures and control in 16 assemblies, losing the majority in only one. Financial strength allowed the Republican Party to make extensive use of special consulting firms and computers to draft reapportionment plans, all of which was essentially beyond the means of the Democratic Party. In addition, the Republicans actively speculated on the ideological differences between liberal and conservative Democrats, winning the latter over to their own side.

There was also the strong hope that the move away from the big cities would decrease the constituency of liberal, reformist politicians and would increase the influence of the more conservative individuals who defend mainly the interests of middle and wealthy strata.

In time, however, the Republicans encountered insurmountable obstacles. Many factors were at work here: the unfavorable state of the economy, the declining popularity of the Republican President, cases of desertion by loyal Republicans and, of course, the very fact that the Democrats had retained their majority in state governments. The polarization of domestic political forces, the contraction of the Reagan conservative base and a slight shift to the center in public opinion also had an effect. "After the pendulum had swung too far to the right in 1980, it passed its most conservative point in 1981 and began its backward swing after the Americans had a real taste of conservatism"--this is how prominent Democratic party official V. Cleaphas described the changes.

According to E. Lewis, the political director (and campaign chairman) of the Democratic National Committee, the Republicans allocated 3 million dollars, a staff of 15 and the latest computer equipment for the reapportionment battle, while the Democrats were able to put up only 200,000 dollars, 2 employees (plus one part-time helper) and no computers. Nevertheless, the Democrats won the battle in the state legislatures. According to Vice-Chairman R. Bond of the Republican National Committee, "the reapportionment of late 1981 and early 1982 hurt the Republican Party.... For this reason, Republican strategists...are not as optimistic in 1982 as they were in 1981."²⁵ Whereas there was once the hope of at least a slight number of additional seats in the House as a result of the realignment of district boundaries, by summer 1982 other predictions were being made about the November election--there was the danger of losing from 15 to 40 seats. Republicans in some states continued to protest district boundaries in the courts, but this round of the political game had actually been lost, according to authoritative sources.²⁶ As for the state legislatures, they again unequivocally demonstrated their direct connection with national political issues.

An analysis of the composition, organization and functions of the highest representative state bodies and their interaction with other government institutions proves that they are one of the most important mechanisms for the realization of the American bourgeoisie's class supremacy. Recognizing their value, U.S. ruling circles have made more vigorous attempts in recent years to assign legislatures a more important role in public administration.

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